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This thesis argues the need to improve intelligence sharing among Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and the United States to better combat the emerging threat of terrorism 
in South America within the Tri-Border Area region shared by the three countries 
mentioned.  It argues that a multilateral approach among all of the countries is needed to 
effectively combat the emerging threat. Chapter I presents evidence that significant 
fundraising for major terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, HAMAS, and possibly 
Al Qaeda occurs in the region.  If it goes unabated, this threat may even evolve into 
active cells that could threaten U.S. and allied interests in Latin America. 
 Chapter II argues why a capable intelligence community is needed to effectively 
combat terrorism. It also argues that within a democracy, intelligence communities must 
balance effectiveness vs. oversight.  A highly effective intelligence organization can 
threaten democratic principles, yet too much oversight into an agency’s activities may 
hamstring it and make it ineffective.  Real world examples are examined to support this 
argument, and the development of oversight in the United States intelligence community 
is discussed to show that even in consolidated democracies, the issue is ongoing.   The 
chapter concludes with a proposal for an ideal type intelligence community model that 
combines effective, all-source agencies with a mix of different oversight mechanisms at 
various levels. 
 Chapter III examines the intelligence communities of Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay to determine how close they are to the ideal type model.  It argues that 
Argentina is the closest, yet has some areas that it could improve on.  Brazil’s community 
is considered politicized, and in need of better focus on actual threats to the nation vs. 
what is perceived; however progress is being made as this thesis is written.  Paraguay is 
considered the furthest from the ideal type model.  This is due to its legacy of a forty-year 
dictatorship, a weak, unconsolidated democracy, and high levels of systemic corruption.  
The National Guard State Partnership program is examined as a potential tool that may 
help Paraguay toward democratic stability, thus enabling it to be a more effective partner 
in an intelligence coalition within the region.  The Chapter concludes with a review of 
multilateral organizations in the area, and concludes that the best organization to support 
  xiv
a multilateral intelligence sharing initiative is Mercosur.  In fact it shows that Mercosur is 
well on its way to achieving this goal. 
Chapter IV examines U.S. aid to each country to determine if it has helped in their 
intelligence communities evolve closer to the ideal type model.  It concludes that this is 
generally not the case, and that U.S. assistance has been more paramilitary in nature 
supporting counter-narcotics, and some counter-terrorism training, but not toward long-
term development of the intelligence community. 
Chapter V concludes with policy recommendations that will enable the United 
States to bilaterally improve each country’s community capability, thus making them 
better regional partners in an intel-sharing network.  It also discusses what resources the 
United States might have to offer Mercosur in its ongoing process of developing a 
regional security organization; and that this is the primary organization that the United 
States should work with to share information on transnational threats within the region. 
  xv
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how information sharing between the 
Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan Intelligence agencies can be improved in order to 
counter the emerging terrorist threat within the Tri-Border Area of South America.     
This subject is of growing importance as links to major Middle East terrorist 
organizations within the Tri-Border Area have been confirmed, and money for these 
various organizations has been raised within the region to fund terrorism abroad.  It is 
also important to ensure that as intelligence networks are improved and made more 
efficient, democracy is not undermined. 
The major research question is: How can cooperation in sharing intelligence 
information between the agencies involved be improved to better combat transnational 
threats such as terrorism within the region?  The argument is that to fight an 
asymmetrical threat such as terrorism, one must have good intelligence on the subject.  
Thus agencies within the Tri-Border Area, especially in Paraguay, must be made more 
effective and work multilaterally.  The problem is an effective security intelligence 
agency is also a very dangerous organism to democracy if abused; therefore a balance 
between efficiency and oversight must be reached.  Secondly, the countries involved, 
with Argentina possibly excepted, do not necessarily desire a multilateral security 
arrangement. 
Increased funding from the United States and the need for many Latin American 
military forces to re-define their roles and missions may make counter-terrorism 
operations attractive. Yet the domestic mission of counter-terrorism has some analysts 
voicing their concerns that such operations could lead countries back into old problems of 
human rights abuses that plagued them in the past during their campaigns against 
insurgents.1 An example would be recently increased military cooperation with the 
                                                 
1 J. Patrice McSherry, National Security and Social Crisis in Argentina (Journal of Third World 
Studies; Americus; Spring 2000) pp. 21-38   
Laura Kalmanowiecki, “Origins and Applications for Political Policing in Argentina” Latin American 
Perspectives, Issue 111, Vol. 27, No. 2 (March 2000) pp. 48-50 
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Paraguayan National Police and military since the September 11th to improve their 
counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities.  However, some felt the training 
closely resembled counter-insurgency operations.2  This example also supports a long-
standing debate that was raised at a Strategic Studies Institute conference to discuss the 
roles of armed forces in the hemisphere.  Many from Latin America argued that U.S. 
assistance usually had a single-minded focus, such as narco-trafficking, and did not 
address problems in a comprehensive manner.3   
Until recently, most Latin American militaries were also wary of internally 
focused missions, such as counter-narcotics and domestic security. They felt these were 
secondary missions, and take away from their primary purpose, that of national defense.4 
However, this thesis will argue in the following case studies Argentina sent a very mixed 
message at a recent conference on the Tri-Border Area, Paraguay is using a combination 
of both military and police to combat terrorism within the region, and while Brazil 
continues to equip its military for external missions, its military intelligence apparatus 
remains domestically focused.  Michael Desch’s argument in Civilian Control of the 
Military5 is that even in today’s climate of uncertain threat, an externally focused military 
is important for good civil-military relations.  There are many critics of Desch, and one 
can easily find fault with his oversimplification of military roles and missions.  However, 
he brings to the fore a critical argument going on in many Latin American countries: 
what is the role of the military without a visible external threat?  This will be explored in 
detail as this thesis examines United States policy toward the countries of the Tri-Border 
Area, and also how these countries see their counter-terrorism mission, whether it is a 
police, military, or combined matter.  This thesis argues that the level of threat within the 
                                                 
2 Larry Birns and Ross Knutson, Paraguay: South America’s Terrorist Club Med? (Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs Press Release; 18 October 2001 p. 4) [http://www.coha.org/Press_Releases/01-
Paraguay.htm] 
3 William Stanley, “Sub-regional Cooperation” Chapt 13, from Conference Report The Role of the 
Armed Forces in the Americans: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century, Donald Shulz, ed. (U.S. 
Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1998) p. 148 
4 The Inter-American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The Organization of American States, A 
Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemisphere Governance (Washington, 
D.C. April 1997) p. 32 
5 Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 
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Tri-Border area is at both a low intensity, and more of a transnational financing issue, 
thus it needs to be treated as a civilian domestic intelligence and police matter, and 
should be combated in this way.   
The issue is the ability of national police forces and civilian intelligence agencies 
to combat the threat within the Tri-Border area.  All have very different capabilities and 
attitudes on how to police the area.  Argentina has a very capable National Gendarmerie, 
Federal Police, and Coast Guard for internal security, but is plagued with an economic 
crisis, and has a record of abuse within its intelligence community.  As recently as 1996, 
the Argentine National Gendarmerie was conducting illegal domestic surveillance of 
citizens,6 and in 1999 Argentine Military Intelligence units were conducting surveillance 
of students, judges, media, and political party leaders7 though expressly forbidden by law.   
In regard to Brazil, they too have very capable state and federal police agencies, 
yet they also have a legacy of repression under the country’s central intelligence organ 
that was known as the SNI.  Brazil also does not share the same set of priorities as 
Argentina and Paraguay.  For Brazil, the thesis will argue that they are putting more 
counter-terrorism and counter-narcotic emphasis on their Amazonian border with 
Colombia, due to infiltrations by narco-traffickers and terrorist groups from Colombia; 
mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC).  Brazil sees their northern 
border security as a more pressing danger. Brazil also does not see its national police 
force as an equal to its military, and is wary of multilateral operations, especially if they 
are sponsored by the United States.   
Finally, Paraguay, which is the weakest partner in the group, also has the most 
terrorist activity within its borders, primarily in Ciudad de Este.  In the following section 
on the terrorist threat in the region, this thesis will demonstrate that Paraguay has been 
the source of most of the overt terrorist acts such as car bombings, and is the hub for the 
financing of transnational terrorist groups.   Paraguay has the willingness to combat the 
emerging threat within their borders, at least at the Federal level, but they lack ability and 
competence within both their security and intelligence agencies.      
                                                 
6 J. Patrice McSherry, “Argentina: Dismantling an Authoritarian Legacy” NACLA Report on the 
Americas Vol 33, No. 5 (Mar/Apr 2000) p. 1  
7 Ibid.  
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The dilemma of intelligence lies in the fact that a very effective intelligence 
agency can also be a very dangerous weapon against democracy if misused.  Even in 
consolidated democracies such as the United States, abuses have occurred.  A good 
example is the notorious COINTELPRO8 program concocted by the FBI under Director 
J. Edgar Hoover that was found by the Church Committee on intelligence oversight in 
1976 to have conducted illegal surveillance of domestic political groups within the 
United States, and not of foreign agents for which it was intended.  More recently, in the 
aftermath of September 11th, the debate continues.  As Attorney General Ashcroft advises 
U.S. citizens to trust the government to do the right thing regarding domestic security, a 
recent report stated that the FBI made errors on 75 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) applications.  The FISA was established as a check to ensure that FBI domestic 
surveillance does not abuse civil rights.  All of these infractions were in 2000, thus one 
cannot attribute the heightened sense of urgency after September 11th as reason for the 
errors.9  Debate also continues over the FBI monitoring internet sites and infiltrating 
assemblies, whether this is justified in light of the level of sophistication terrorists have 
demonstrated, or if it constitutes an erosion of civil rights.10   
France offers an even more striking example of the oversight dilemma in a 
consolidated democracy.  To this day the country struggles with its inwardly focused 
domestic and highly politicized intelligence services.11  French intelligence services have 
committed abuses ranging from illegal wiretaps of government officials to the debacle of 
special operations such as the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior.  In Latin America this 
problem is further exacerbated.  Democracy in many countries is still being consolidated 
                                                 
8 Counterintelligence Program under J. Edgar Hoover from 1956-1971 under the auspices of 
combating domestic espionage organizations, but in actuality was widely accused of targeting racial and 
political groups.  The “Church Committee” on intelligence oversight specifically addressed the abuses of 
COINTELPRO (http//www.cointel.org) 
9 International Herald Tribune, August 24-25, 2002 p. 4 
10 Christian Science Monitor [Lexis Nexis] June 6, 2002  
11 Douglas Porch, “French Intelligence Culture: A Historical and Political Perspective” Intelligence 
and National Security, Vol 10, No. 3 (July 1995), pp. 494-495 
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and remains shaky. Coups were thought to be getting more and more remote, but recent 
attempts in Paraguay and Venezuela remind us otherwise.12   
Terrorism has two significant features that make it very difficult to combat.  First 
is the fact that it is conducted asymmetrically, without regard to national boundaries and 
conventional modes of fighting.  It ignores rules of basic humanity, and conventional 
norms of combat.  Second, terrorist organizations maintain very low signatures making 
them difficult to track and even more difficult to eradicate.  These two issues make 
effective intelligence agencies and the need to share intelligence critical weapons in the 
war on terrorism.  Without effective intelligence on the terrorist threat, states will have a 
very difficult time even knowing what threat they are facing, much less how to focus 
resources to effectively combat the threat.  Additionally, the transnational nature of 
terrorism and the increased effects of globalization make the need to share intelligence 
information even more critical.  Countries are finding that an effective war on terrorism 
must be a multilateral effort.  Unilateral action at best will just displace the threat to a 
different part of the world, where it will re-emerge, virtually undamaged.  An example 
would be throwing Osama Bin-Laden out of Sudan, only for him to emerge in 
Afghanistan in an even stronger position in which to wage international terrorism. 
 
B. THE TERRORIST THREAT IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA 
The threat of terrorism within the Tri-Border area between Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay really manifested itself in the 1992 and 1994 bombings against the Jewish 
community center and Israeli embassy in Buenos Aries.  The region has been a long 
established haven for smuggling and contraband due to the lack of border controls within 
the area.  U.S. attention to the region rose dramatically after the tragic events of 
September 11th, when evidence began to link several vendors in the area as financiers for 
major international terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and HAMAS. 13   
Terrorism within the region is of a much lower profile than in the Middle East.  
This is due primarily to the fact that no definitive evidence has surfaced proving Al 
                                                 
12 Author refers to 1999 election violence and coup attempt in Paraguay, and aborted coup attempt 
against Chavez in Venezuela in April, 2002 
13 San Francisco Chronicle, May 4, 2002 p. A10  
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Qaeda is operating within the area. 14  Sources within the State Department, Central 
Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency noted that the primary activity has 
been smuggling and money laundering.15   Thus the more active theaters such as the 
Middle East and Afghanistan have received a great deal more attention and greater 
funding priorities due to the more immediate threat of direct action against the United 
States.  This does not mean that the potential threat does not exist, and this chapter argues 
that if more proactive measures within the Tri-Border Area are not taken, terrorist cells 
within the area will only grow, and pose a greater threat to the region, and to the United 
States.  
 Personnel with connections to major terrorist16 organizations overseas such as 
Hezbollah and Hamas have been the primary money launderers in the region.  There have 
also been reports of fund-raising directly for Hezbollah by merchants of middle-eastern 
descent.  One recent article through interviews with the chief of the Paraguayan National 
Police cited the existence of fundraisers for Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Al Qaeda all within 
Ciudad Del Este.17  One merchant, Ahmad Barakat, has been suspected of raising nearly 
$50 million in two years.18 Brazilian officials recently estimated as much as $6 billion 
annually is illegally laundered within the Tri-Border region.19  It is hard to estimate how 
much of this amount goes toward other activities such as smuggling, narco trafficking, or 
weapons for the FARC in Colombia, but support for terrorism is substantial.  One 
estimate is Hezbollah received $12 million from the Tri-Border area alone in 2000.  
Hezbollah’s total annual operating budget is estimated at about $100 million, thus the 
region may be responsible for over ten percent of Hezbollah’s operating revenue.20  
                                                 
14 Author’s interview with Mr. James Casson at the State Department in Washington D.C. May 20th 
2002 
15 Author’s interviews with U.S. Intelligence Community officials, 20-22 May 2002 in Washington 
D.C. Langley, Virginia, and Bowling AFB, Virginia 
16 The author labels these organizations as terrorist since they have a history of committing acts of 
terror against US interests and her allies.  This label is problematic for Latin American Arab populations, 
which the author will discuss later 
17 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In The Party of God” The New Yorker (October 28, 2002) p. 75-83 
18 San Francisco Chronicle, May 4th 2002, p. A10 
19 Peter Hudson, “There Are No Terrorists Here” Newsweek (November 19, 2001) p. 39 
20 Goldberg, p. 77 
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Additionally it has been reported that a primary Hezbollah leader was in Ciudad de Este 
directly coordinating funds for the organization, and was working with Barakat.21   
What these funds are being used for is debatable, since Hezbollah is considered 
by many from the Middle East to be a charitable organization, and many Muslims in 
South America openly support it.  This is evidenced by the fact that one of the four Arab 
language television stations in the Tri-Border Area is Hezbollah’s official channel.22 It 
can be argued however, that even if the money is being used for such causes as to support 
the families of “martyrs” in Palestine for instance, it helps to ensure a healthy flow of 
suicide bombers will continue to plague regions such as the Middle East, Europe, and the 
United States.  Therefore the argument can be made that the Tri-Border area is a key 
center for terrorist financing and the primary counter-terrorism strategy for the area 
should be cutting off the money that it supplies to other terrorist organizations. 
The question of direct offensive activity within the Tri- 
Border Area is more complex.  Though there is no conclusive evidence of an Al-Qaeda 
cell in the Tri-Border Area, there has been recent speculation about whether or not one 
exists.  Agence France Presse ran a feature a week after the attacks of September 11th 
that cited a former Brazilian official who stated that Osama Bin Laden had planned to put 
a terrorist cell in the region.23  This has been corroborated by a further report that Islamic 
Jihad, which is believed to have a cell operating in Ciudad De Este, has direct ties to Al-
Qaeda.24  Finally, there was a feature run by the ABC Color news service out of 
Asuncion, Paraguay that was picked up by BBC Monitoring stating that Paraguayan and 
foreign security forces were searching for Taliban government fugitives within the Tri-
Border Area, after the United States’ attack on Taliban positions in Afghanistan.25 
In addition to possible Al-Qaeda ties, no less than three terrorist bombing 
attempts originated from the area within the past decade.  The bombings of the Israeli 
                                                 
21 FBIS, Paraguay Press Highlights May 30th 2002, and Goldberg, p. 78 
22 Wall Street Journal, (New York) November 16th, 2001, p. A10 
23 Agence France Presse, September 19th, 2001 
24 Larry Birns and Ross Knutson, “Paraguay: South America’s Terrorist Club Med?” Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs, (October 18th 2001) p. 1. Available [Online]: http://www.coha.org/Press_Releases/01-
20-Paraguay.htm accessed March 14, 2002 
25 Global News Wire, BBC Monitoring International Reports [Lexis Nexis] February 5, 2002 
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Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aries in 1992 and 1994 respectively, 
were successful.  A planned bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Asuncion in 1996 was 
thwarted.  The Asuncion bombing attempt is significant since it was thwarted by a 
bilateral effort between Argentine and United States’ intelligence agencies dubbed 
“Operation Centaur” to share information and coordinate efforts.26 Thus, it clearly 
demonstrates the value of cooperation among intelligence agencies to combat terrorism.  
These efforts will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.  
It can be established that though money laundering has been the primary form of 
terrorist activity within the region, more overt acts of terror have occurred in the area in 
recent years.  Without good organizations working together to track these activities, the 
Tri-Border Area will continue to fund terrorist organizations in other parts of the world, 
and more direct action may continue to emerge and even grow against U.S. targets and 
those of her allies within the region. 
The problems with tracking terrorist activity are its clandestine nature, very low 
signature, and the fact that terrorist organizations are transnational.  Paul Wilkinson states 
that, “almost every significant terrorist campaign has an international dimension, even 
when it is mounting a specific challenge to a government within its own territory.”27 He 
makes an excellent example with the Irish Republican Army.  The organization receives 
funding from the United States, uses the Republic of Ireland as a safe haven, and carries 
out its attacks within Great Britain.28  It is ironic that the United States with its history of 
tough policies against terrorists has been a major source of funding for an organization 
that has caused one of our closest allies so much pain and grief.     
In the age of globalization, terrorism is not just the host state’s problem.  
Multilateral efforts must be established to combat the threat, or else it will simply move 
to a new location and continue operations. An excellent example of this is the failure to 
build a coalition with the Sudanese government when they came to the United States with 
                                                 
26 The Wall Street Journal, November 16th 2001, p. A10 
27 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response, (London: Cass, 2001) p. 188 
28 Ibid. 
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an offer to allow the U.S. to extradite Osama bin Laden in 1996.29 After no kind of a deal 
could be reached, the Sudanese unilaterally expelled bin Laden to Afghanistan.  It was 
thought that at least by expelling bin Laden out of Sudan, it would disrupt his operation,30 
but within two years he was back in operation, and started a string of terrorist activity 
against the United States that culminated in the September 11th attacks.  Therefore it can 
be argued Afghanistan was an even better base of operation, since it afforded the Al-
Qaeda network very rugged terrain to train and hide in under a government that was 
openly supportive of him, or at least easily influenced by bin Laden’s vast resources. 
Unilateral action, therefore does not necessarily eradicate terrorist activity, 
especially if it has grown to a level that it has become transnational, like the Al-Qaeda 
network, or is decentralized, like the emerging threat in the Tri-Border Area.  Frank Mora 
coined the term “balloon effect” when the same type of unilateral action was applied to 
narco-trafficking.31Essentially, by unilaterally acting against an organization with 
transnational ties to eradicate its operations within the border of one country, the state 
may simply cause the organization to relocate to another region.  This is illustrated by the 
analogy of squeezing a balloon, and instead of bursting it; you just cause a bulge in 
another area.  This same analogy can apply to the terrorist threat in the Tri-Border Area.  
It is stealthy and decentralized to the point that law enforcement cannot identify a single 
charismatic leader at its head, like Guzman of Sendero Luminoso, or Carlos the Jackal.  
One may not even exist.  Therefore, past strategies that worked successfully against an 
organization such as Sendero will not apply for the Tri-Border Area.  For Paraguay to 
suddenly get tough and start an all-out eradication campaign against alleged Hezbollah 
financiers, narco-traffickers, and smugglers would most likely result in spreading these 
threats into neighboring Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay like a virus.  This type of action 
may exacerbate the problem, since it would also anger the large Muslim and non-Muslim 
                                                 
29 Washington Post, (Washington D.C.) October 3rd 2001, p. A1 
30 Ibid. 
31 Frank O. Mora, “Victims of the balloon effect: Drug trafficking and U.S. policy in Brazil and the 
Southern Cone of Latin America” from The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, vol 21, 
issue 2 (Summer 1996) [from Proquest database], p. 4 
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Arabic populations within the region, and may in fact have an unintended reverse effect 
by promoting sympathy for illicit organizations that have been targeted as terrorist. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will use both primary and secondary source material.  Primary sources 
include treaties and multilateral agreements, interviews with intelligence analysts, and 
news articles from the countries involved regarding terrorism and their security agencies.  
Secondary sources will include texts by leading authorities on intelligence and terrorism 
to give the reader an understanding of what the conventional wisdom in the field is 
regarding how to combat terrorist threats.  Due to the emerging nature of this issue and 
how events of September 11th continue to shape it, news and journal articles by leading 
academics on the subject will supply a lot of the information from which arguments are 
supported.     
 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis will be organized in the following manner. Chapter II will argue why 
intelligence is critical to combating a threat such as terrorism.  It will show that an 
effective intelligence community must be capable of breaking into the terrorist 
organizations decision cycle to gain the initiative.  It will argue that in fighting threats 
such as terrorism economic and human intelligence are the primary weapons of the 
community.  The chapter will also argue why information sharing is critical in effectively 
combating transnational threats.  It will then examine the dilemma that an effective 
intelligence community poses to a democracy, and that a balance must be reached 
between efficiency and oversight.  The chapter will conclude with a model of an “ideal 
type” of intelligence community within a democratic government that best balances 
oversight with efficient intelligence gathering and analysis mechanisms. 
Chapter III will be a case study of the intelligence networks of Argentina, Brazil 
and Paraguay within the Tri-Border area.  It will examine the structures of each country’s 
intelligence community and compare them to the ideal type model developed in Chapter 
II to see how close they are to this ideal, and what deficiencies exist.   
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It will then examine what agreements have been established for coordinating 
intelligence within the area, and how effective they are.  The Mercosur trade agreement 
will be featured to determine if it has had an effective spin-off in helping partner 
countries also share security information.  Second, It will determine what deficiencies 
exist in the networks, especially in regard to coordinating, collection and dissemination 
efforts. It will argue why these deficiencies exist. Are problems due to lack of ability? Or 
does nationalism, and unwillingness to engage in multilateral security arrangements come 
into play as well?   
Chapter IV will examine what current United States initiatives are in place to 
assist in improving intelligence networks within the area. It will refer to the ideal type 
intelligence community and determine if the deficiencies found in the countries’ 
communities in Chapter III are being addressed by U.S. aid. The chapter will also 
examine what bilateral agreements are in place to share information between countries in 
the region and the U.S.  It will determine how effective they are, and what barriers may 
be impeding further initiatives.  It will argue why the United States should be concerned 
with combating terrorism within the region, and why it is a growing threat to our national 
security.    It will specifically look at issues of nationalism, and suspicion of U.S. 
influence, and how they might be mitigated.  It will examine how the State Partnership 
Program with Paraguay may contribute.  The reason for this is Paraguay is considered the 
weakest link in the coalition, and is also the only State Partnership Program participant 
within this group. It will determine whether the program can directly affect Paraguay’s 
ability to better gather and share intelligence, or whether it is better suited in its primary 
role of civilian agency engagement.  Thus by improving Paraguay’s economic and social 
stability, it will make it more a more effective coalition partner with Argentina and 
Brazil.  This chapter will close by examining the argument of bilateral vs. multilateral 
cooperation and their effectiveness in combating counter-terrorist activity.   
Chapter V will briefly review the issues that hinder intra-regional cooperation 
between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.  It will also summarize the barriers in place 
that hinder a cooperative effort by the United States.  Next the chapter will offer 
recommendations that the United States could implement to bring the regional 
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intelligence communities closer to the ideal community model.  The thesis will argue that 
the United States’ engagement in Latin America has primarily been military, and it needs 
to balance this with more civil, and infrastructure building engagements.  This is a highly 
debated subject, since many Latin American countries are upgrading their militaries, and 
the United States will still play a major role in this effort.  Yet the U.S. must also make 
inroads in other areas. It will argue that initiatives like the SPP program can assist United 
States’ policy in this effort; whether by directly addressing issues like information 
sharing, or by indirectly helping to build national infrastructure, and therefore improve 
overall national stability.   
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II.  THE TERRORIST THREAT AND THE NEED FOR 
INTELLIGENCE: A DILEMMA OF EFICIENCY VS. OVERSIGHT 
 This chapter argues why a good intelligence network is critical to combating the 
threat of terrorism.  It will discuss the need to share intelligence information; that without 
an integrated intelligence community that shares information and coordinates its efforts, 
law enforcement agencies will be “chasing ghosts”.  Additionally it will argue that the 
primary sources of intelligence to combat terrorism should be economic and human 
intelligence.  The second part of this chapter is an examination of the dilemma that 
effective intelligence agencies pose to a democratic state.  This is the basic “Dilemma of 
Efficiency vs. Oversight” within the organization.32  It will argue that efficient domestic 
security intelligence agencies are also dangerous to democratic principles and need 
proper oversight.  This is especially true for South American democracies as they 
continue to consolidate.  Yet it even applies to mature democracies such as the United 
States.  Examples of this struggle with oversight within consolidated democracies will be 
provided to illustrate that this issue is not simply a Third World, or emerging democracy 
problem, but one that faces all democracies. It must be solved before intelligence 
agencies can move forward toward cooperative efforts with other states.   
The end product of this chapter will be an “ideal type” of intelligence community 
model that depicts the best compromise between an organ that can most efficiently 
gather, analyze, and share intelligence and the control mechanisms that keep it 
subordinate and responsive to governmental control.  This model will give the reader a 
baseline to use in comparing the intelligence agencies of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
in the following chapters. These levels of both efficiency and oversight will affect 
interagency cooperation within the region and with the United States in combating 
terrorism.  This is because intelligence sharing is based primarily upon mutual trust 
between agencies. Therefore if an agency within a coalition is deemed to be inefficient 
and may compromise sources, other agencies may be quite reluctant to share information 
                                                 
32 Professor Kenneth Dombroski at the Naval Postgraduate School first made the author aware of this 
term during a lecture in April of 2002.   
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with it.  In Latin America, the heritage of authoritarian regimes misusing intelligence 
organizations has made governments reluctant to share information with one another 
since democratization.  Knowing that intelligence agencies within a coalition are well 
organized, professional, and under firm democratic control will better facilitate this.       
 
A.   THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE   
The basis of any multilateral cooperative effort in combating terrorism must be a 
capable intelligence network.  Without good intelligence, law enforcement agencies will 
never be able to take the initiative away from the terrorists.  They will be left reacting to 
their actions, and basically picking up the pieces after each terrorist act has occurred.  
The only way to take this initiative away is to break into their decision cycle.  Paul 
Wilkinson argues that, “high-quality intelligence is at the heart of proactive [emphasis 
added] counter-terrorism strategy”.33  He argues that successful intelligence can pre-empt 
terrorist attacks through advance warning, and even lead to the break-up of terrorist cells.  
This thesis argues that the primary intelligence foci to combat terrorism must be good 
economic intelligence to allow governments to interdict the money flow to these 
organizations, and human intelligence or HUMINT to allow the government to break into 
the terrorists’ decision cycles.  In the Tri-Border Area HUMINT is critical in infiltrating 
both the financial organizations that may be funding terrorism, and assessing the 
radicalization of groups to determine if “bona fide” active terrorist cells are operating 
within the area.    
As discussed in Chapter I, the money trails that fund terrorism can be illegal such 
as narco trafficking, or laundering money through various “front businesses” or they can 
be legitimate donations by merchants running legitimate businesses.  Michael Herman 
notes that the United States has significantly increased its economic intelligence 
capability since the end of the Cold War.  A primary reason has been to track “bad 
actors” in the international market, to include money laundering for terrorist activity.34  A 
recent example has been the massive effort the United States put into building worldwide 
                                                 
33 Wilkinson, p. 215 
34 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) pp. 51-52 
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coalitions to track Al-Qaeda’s various accounts and global business connections in order 
to stem its money flow.  The Tri-Border Area should be no exception.  The need for a 
sophisticated economic intelligence capability within the Tri-Border Area to track the 
money flow to organizations such as Hezbollah is quite apparent. Unfortunately this 
capability is something that the region lacks, according to the State Department.35 
A second need for economic intelligence is to monitor corruption.  This problem 
is rampant in Paraguay, and Argentina and Brazil are not blameless either.  Well-funded 
terrorist organizations can easily co-opt local government officials.  The Barakat saga 
yields yet more light on this issue.  In an interview with the press, he quite candidly 
stated that it should cost about $50,000 for his troubles with Paraguayan authorities to 
disappear.36  Paraguayan authorities vehemently denied this claim. Whether it is true or 
not, it provides a good example of the perception of corruption in the area.   
In regard to Human Intelligence, and breaking into the terrorist decision cycle, 
Mark Lowenthal argues, “HUMINT becomes increasingly important, since penetrating 
terrorist groups is a means of obtaining the necessary information.”37 Herman supports 
this argument also when he states, “Israeli HUMINT has been a key element in its battle 
against terrorism, and the same applies to others’ terrorist coverage.”38 Another 
advantage of HUMINT for agencies with limited resources is the relatively low cost, 
compared to signals or imagery intelligence.  The problem is it takes time and effort to 
build and cultivate the contacts capable of penetrating terrorist cells.  Another issue is the 
actual source.  Intelligence operatives are not normally the deep cover agents involved in 
HUMINT collection.  In most cases the sources are informants within the organization 
that have been turned.   
Therefore, good HUMINT sources within a terrorist organization may actually 
mean dealing with terrorists themselves, who may only be motivated by financial means 
and their motives may be suspect.  Lowenthal argues that policy makers may find the use 
                                                 
35 Author’s Interview with State Department Official James Cason, 20 May 2002. 
36 The Wall Street Journal, November 28th 2001, p. A10 
37 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000) p. 175 
38 Herman, p. 66 
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of “turned” terrorists as HUMINT sources quite objectionable.39The paradox is quite 
apparent when a country with a policy of not negotiating with terrorists may find that its 
best method of penetrating a terrorist cell may be doing just that.  A historical example is 
the capture of famed terrorist Carlos the Jackal.  A paid informant who was instrumental 
in Carlos’ capture was a terrorist within his cell on the CIA’s payroll.40 
The use of HUMINT to combat terrorism in the Tri-Border area reinforces the 
need for cooperation among agencies.  Since the need exists to use informants of a 
dubious nature to get results as the Carlos example shows, multiple sources of 
information will be needed.  This will prevent over-reliance on a single source that may 
provide biased or outright false information.  By harnessing the efforts of multiple 
agencies employing HUMINT assets, information about the threat can be corroborated, 
and a better, more balanced picture will be obtained. 
 
B.   THE DILEMMA OF EFFICIENCY VERSUS OVERSIGHT 
Before one looks at the specific cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and how 
their intelligence agencies work, it will be instructive to review the general dilemma of 
maintaining oversight over intelligence agencies in a democratic society verses allowing 
them the leeway and autonomy they need to be efficient, and perform the tasks for which 
they were created.  Dr. Tom Bruneau notes that this dilemma is one of the most 
problematic issues in civil-military relations for new democracies.41 Therefore, it will 
help to better understand how this dilemma affects emerging and new democracies by 
observing it in established ones such as the United States and France. 
The United States is arguably the oldest uninterrupted democratic experiment in 
the world.  Its constitutional charter has been reviewed, borrowed from and even outright 
plagiarized by numerous emerging democracies.  Therefore it would be logical for one 
examining the dilemma of oversight of intelligence agencies in a democracy to see how 
                                                 
39 Lowenthal, p. 190 
40 Ibid. 
41Tom Bruneau, Occasional Paper #5: “Intelligence and Democratization: The Challenge of Control in 
New Democracies”, The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, March 2000 p. 1 
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“the Yankees did it”.  First one has to ask what dilemmas have arisen within the United 
States in regard to its intelligence agencies and domestic issues? Second, do key 
structures exist within the United States government to facilitate the oversight of 
domestic security intelligence? 
In answer to the first question, the citizens of the United States in general did not 
have a great deal of interest in intelligence oversight, since any excesses were happening 
overseas in places like Guatemala, Chile, and of course, Cuba.  Since Americans were not 
the victims of these excesses, Congress could afford to ignore the minority of constituents 
that may have raised concerns about these activities.  This changed dramatically in the 
1970s, when news of domestic intelligence excesses came to light.  The year 1976 was 
even dubbed “The Year of Intelligence” due to the amount of Senate and House hearings 
on the excesses of the intelligence agencies, primarily by the CIA, in domestic 
issues.42This led to the creation of permanent House and Senate intelligence oversight 
subcommittees, so formal legislative oversight in the United States is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.   
In answer to the second question, one of the best oversight mechanisms in the 
United States has been the media and the fact that a free press is quite able to blow the 
whistle on government excesses, to include secret government bureaucracies such as the 
CIA.  Loch Johnson conclusively argues this point when he stated that the original 
congressional hearings on CIA excesses came about due to the media headlines that 
broke in December 1974 in the New York Times.  He notes that: 
 
While the revelations about covert action in Chile may have been 
ignored by Congress as just another necessary chapter in the Cold War 
against Soviet interference in the developing world, spying on American 
citizens – voters – was an allegation difficult for legislators to dismiss.  
Blazing newspaper headlines demanded oversight, not the usual 
overlook.43 
 
                                                 
42 Loch Johnson, “The CIA and the Question of Accountability” Intelligence and National Security 
(January 1997) pp. 178-200 
43 Ibid. p. 182 
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Another advantage the United States has in controlling its intelligence agencies is the fact 
that the government is structured to be inefficient but controllable. A separation of power 
between its three branches is maintained through a system of checks and balances that 
does a very good job of ensuring the executive branch, where security intelligence 
agencies normally reside, does not become too powerful, allowing its actions go 
unchecked.  In Latin America, checks and balances may be listed in their constitutions, 
but the executive generally wields a disproportionate amount of power and usually has 
the ability to override the other branches and rule by decree.  This is true in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Paraguay. 
 France is brought up as a counter-example of a mature democracy in the 
examination of the oversight dilemma to give the reader an entirely different perspective.  
France, considered to be a mature and consolidated democracy, continues to struggle with 
oversight, or more appropriately does not even oversee its domestic intelligence 
apparatus.  France has a long history of a very politicized intelligence community.  
Politicians and bureaucrats who have used various branches of the intelligence 
community for personal or political gain have even encouraged this politicization through 
the regular use of wiretaps on other agencies within the government and political 
opponents.44  Therefore French domestic intelligence has evolved to be poorly 
understood and distrusted by policymakers, and its organization is very inefficient, and 
kept that way on purpose. 
 The second and most important reason one must understand the evolution of 
French domestic security, before one can examine the following case study is the French 
ideology of “Guerre Revolutionaire”.  This ideology formed during the Cold War 
basically espoused that the communist subversive threat to France was not a tank army 
crashing through the Fulda Gap, but a more subtle indirect political threat, that would 
manifest itself internally and threaten the security of the country.  One reason for this 
ideology is France had a very active and large communist party for a Western democracy. 
Also, the victories of revolutionary communist movements in Vietnam and Algeria in the 
                                                 
44 Douglas Porch, “French Intelligence Culture” A Historical Perspective from Intelligence and 
National Security (July 1995) pp. 502-503 
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1950s contributed to this mindset. Thus French security forces became inwardly focused 
within her colonies and even toward French citizens at home. Roger Trinquier’s 1961 
book, La Guerre Moderne is a good example of how this doctrine was espoused.45 This 
ideology was imported to Latin America during the Cold War, due to the alarming rate at 
which communist revolutionary movements were gaining prominence in other parts of 
the world, and the fact that the likelihood of a direct conventional or nuclear threat from 
the Soviet Union manifesting itself in the Hemisphere was very small, with Cuba 
excepted.  Alfred Stepan referred to “Guerre Revolutionaire” when he discussed the 
Brazilian military’s “new professionalism” and focus toward internal security at the 
height of the Cold War.  He noted that: 
  
Some of the key ingredients of the new professionalism were observed in 
France in the 1950s and played a major role in the civil-military crises of 
1958 and 1961 [within France].46  
 
He further argues that the Brazilian military adopted this “new professionalization” 
toward internal political issues as the primary security threat to the country during the 
Cold War.   
 Thus as the reader goes into the next chapter, it is important to understand that 
oversight within the intelligence community is quite thorny, and even long established 
democracies such as the United States and France have, and will continue to struggle 
with it.   
 The key issue to understand in this dilemma is that within a democratic society a 
clandestine bureaucracy such as a security intelligence agency will require a constant 
trade-off between ability and governance.  Therefore it may not be in the long-term best 
interests of a country to have a highly effective security intelligence community, if the 
democratic government of that country has issues with control over such an organization.  
As this subject is explored further in this Thesis, the key question to ask will be what type 
                                                 
45 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Frederick A. Praeger: 
New York, 1964) previously published in 1961 as La Guerre Moderne in France. 
46 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion” from 
Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) p. 138 
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and level of support should the United States provide to Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
in the realm of Security Intelligence? Competing interests will emerge. For instance, 
Paraguay itself is not necessarily concerned with being a target for terrorist attack, yet 
illicit financing generated from that country and possibly even cells within that country 
pose a threat to the United States and her interests.  Therefore do we ensure Paraguay’s 
security intelligence forces are capable of combating and reducing that threat, when 
Paraguay’s government is in such disorder and knowing that a strong security intelligence 
agency in this situation will almost certainly lead to domestic abuses? 
 Thus as we proceed to the next chapter and examine each country in detail, it will 
be important to keep this dilemma in mind, and to understand that it is not merely an 
issue for developing and new democracies, but for democracy overall.   
 
C.  THE IDEAL TYPE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MODEL 
To help the reader examine and compare each country’s intelligence community 
in detail, it I have established a baseline model (see figure 1) that would be an ideal type 
of intelligence community.  It exhibits both an efficient structure to gather and analyze 
intelligence, and also has mechanisms in place to ensure subordination to a governmental 
control.  This is the “best case” compromise between the competing interests of oversight 
and efficiency.   
 
1. Oversight 
In the issue of oversight, Peter Gill offers a good model to start from.47  He argues 
that oversight needs to occur at four basic levels: (1) Internal to the agency (Inspector 
General), (2) Executive Branch (Inspector General, or Presidential Oversight Board), (3) 
Congressional (Select Committees), and (4) Public (Interest Groups, Media).  For this 
model I have selected the mechanisms that I believe are the most effective.   
Internal Oversight to the agency would be an Inspector General (IG) that liaisons 
between the agency director and the minister and reports any issues of impropriety that 
arise within the agency. Gill argues that historically, internal IG’s have not been very 
                                                 
47 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (London: Cass, 
1994) pp. 248-305 
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effective, even in the U.S. system.48   One check against cover-up would be that if an 
issue gets to a higher level of oversight, and the director pleads ignorance, the IG could 
be compelled to testify to determine if it was actually ignorant of the situation or was 
directed withhold the information.  If testimony of the IG or the “whistle-blower” that 
brought the information to light in the first case show that this indeed was the case, than 
actions against the director and or the IG would be taken.  Also, the oversight level within 
an agency must be mandated by executive order, so as not to allow a director to “gut it” 
to make it less effective. 
Executive Oversight has traditionally been through an executive oversight board.  
The purpose of this board is primarily to ensure that executive prerogatives and priorities 
regarding intelligence collection and analysis are being emphasized within the 
intelligence community.  It is primarily there to ensure that the intelligence agencies are 
doing what the executive wants them to do, whether the activity is good and bad.   
Congressional Oversight is where the intelligence community is finally held to 
task by a relatively unbiased body.  This is because it is the first level where oversight of 
the intelligence community is out of the control of the executive branch, and the 
opposition parties actually have some representation.  First, permanent select committees 
need to be established.  They cannot be “ad-hoc” but have the same or preferably an even 
higher standing than any other congressional committee.  Serving on the committee must 
be seen as a privilege within the legislature, thus selection to the committee may enhance 
a legislator’s career. This will be a major hurdle for a Latin American legislature since in 
most cases legislators are concerned with “pork politics” and want to serve on 
committees that allow them to benefit their constituents with economic aid or projects 
that provide employment, development, etc.  Intelligence issues do not provide material 
benefits for the constituents; they are mainly issues of national concern. 
Media Oversight is the public’s watchdog over intelligence.  Public opinion is 
very important in a democracy, thus the executive and legislative branches will be very 
concerned with issues that receive media attention.  As noted above with the United 
States, and as the reader will see in the following chapter, media oversight has often been 
                                                 
48 Ibid. pp. 253-254 
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the most effective form of oversight regarding the intelligence community. This is 
especially important in area of domestic security intelligence, a major play in counter-
terrorism intelligence.  Thus an open press is critical to ensure that the public’s interests 
are being served. Though media oversight generally occurs after the fact, it has been the 
greatest catalyst for intelligence reform within the United States.       
 
2. Efficiency 
The ideal type of community has three competing all-source intelligence agencies.  
The first reason for this is it allows the policymaker to get the best overall picture by 
having different agencies with different perspectives look at the issue.49   
  The second reason is that by having more than one all-source agency in the 
community it avoids the problem of “cooked” intelligence, or intelligence that has been 
biased by the agency to suit its agenda.  A good example of this was the United States 
government’s over-reliance on U.S. Air Force intelligence estimates that exaggerated the 
Soviet Bomber threat during the cold war, even when the CIA was providing information 
to the contrary.  This produced an incorrect assessment by policymakers that the United 
States faced a gap in bomber capability against the Soviet Union, when in actuality no 
such gap existed.   
Three agencies are also ideal since they will generally not have the tendency to 
become polarized against each other with estimates, as might be the case if a state had 
only one civilian and one military agency, for instance.  The model has each agency 
under a separate ministry.  This ensures they are focused on specific areas of expertise, 
and that no single agency wields all of the state’s intelligence capability. Basically it 
allows a form of checks and balances that maintains efficiency by not allowing one 
agency to become overwhelmed, and also facilitates oversight. This will also influence 
what type of intelligence information is the primary responsibility for each agency.  In 
our model the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for domestic security intelligence 
within the borders of the state.  The Office of the Executive is responsible for general 
strategic foreign intelligence outside of the state’s borders, and the Ministry of Defense is 
                                                 
49 Lowenthal, p.89 
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concerned with strategic military threats and capabilities.  Thus this division of the 
intelligence requirements allows each primary interest to be covered: military intelligence 
issues from tactical to strategic, domestic security intelligence, and general foreign 
intelligence.   
Though an intelligence community may have the trappings of oversight 
mechanisms in place, they may be ineffective.  To help determine the effectiveness of 
oversight mechanisms, the politicization of an agency must also be considered.  The 
politicization of an agency is inversely proportional to both its effectiveness and 
subordination to democratic control.  This is due to the fact that a highly politicized 
agency may be trying to undermine those it is subordinate too, and in doing so is focusing 
its intelligence efforts on subject areas that are not in the national interest, thus risking 
intelligence failures against actual threats. In rating each agency this thesis borrows from 
Keller’s classification.50 A domestic intelligence bureau is considered the closest 
community in line with the “ideal type” model developed in Chapter II.  A political or 
regime police has greater autonomy and begins to lack mechanisms of control.  It is 
focused against domestic threats, but these can be both real and perceived by the regime 
in power.  An independent security state is the most excessive form of a politicized 
intelligence agency.  This agency has become autonomous from the governing body, and 
lacks any controlling mechanisms.  The agency head directs its focus, whether or not it is 
within the interests of the government.  It can actually become a threat to the government 
in power.  
In regard to a transnational threat such as terrorism, there will be a significant 
overlap between agencies in gathering the required intelligence.  Herman reinforces this 
argument when he states,  
 
In practice foreign and security intelligence overlap.  External 
threats have internal components and vice versa; espionage is foreign but 
                                                 
50 W.W. Keller, The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 13-16; quoted in Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security 
Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (London: Cass, 1994) pp. 60-61. 
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is an internal threat, while few terrorist organizations are without overseas 
connections.51 
 
An example that best illustrates this point would be a hypothetical scenario of 
Brazil in dealing with the FARC terrorist organization in neighboring Colombia.  The 
central foreign intelligence agency would be concerned with issues within Colombia, and 
how Colombian policies or actions against the FARC may push this group toward the 
Brazilian border, thus causing instability.  Military intelligence within the Amazon region 
would contribute by tracking FARC patrolling and border incursions of Brazilian 
sovereignty by FARC paramilitary forces. Finally, domestic intelligence would be 
looking into FARC activity that may actually be occurring within Brazil, or if money 
laundering and drug trafficking within the country is supporting the FARC.  Though each 
agency is within a different department, and specializes on a different strategic interest, 
they all contribute in building the complete intelligence picture on a certain subject. 
Thus there is the need to coordinate this overlap, and direct the intelligence 
collection effort within the community to those areas that are a priority for the national 
interest.  In addition to the three primary agencies, a central intelligence coordination 
committee underneath the executive with no intelligence collection or analysis 
responsibilities would exist.  Its sole mission is to facilitate the flow of analysis from each 
agency to the executive’s national security council, and also coordinate the collection and 
analysis efforts within each agency, based on priorities of national interest. The origin of 
the Central Intelligence Agency within the United States was originally created to 
coordinate the intelligence community.  By putting its own agency underneath it, this role 
of coordination became secondary and lost emphasis.  Thus intelligence coordination and 
community management within the United States is not a formalized issue and tends to 
spark debate, even today.  As late as 1992 a congressional proposal was put forward to 
make the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) the exclusive intelligence community 
manager, and not have the responsibility of an intelligence agency to manage as well.52 
On this committee would be representatives from the executive and all branches of 
                                                 
51 Herman, p.47 
52 Herman, pp.317-318 
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government that have intelligence collection responsibilities.  It would be similar to a 
“joint chiefs of staff” in the military.  Herman argues this point when he states,  
 
The immediately practical course may be to learn defence’s lesson 
about the importance of central staffs.  In their different ways both the 
U.S. DCI and the British Coordinator depend for effectiveness on 
adequate staff support.  Only an intelligence staff of the right size and 
competence can provide them with independent central fact-finding and 
evaluation for big and contentious issues of management.53   
 
 This model is a bit of a simplification, and is intended to depict the general 
organizations and oversight mechanisms in place for an intelligence community within a 
democratic government.  Each state will have varying needs and national security 
concerns that will drive variations of this model.  For instance, a state may have other 
collectors within its infrastructure.  The Foreign Ministry’s diplomatic corps is one 
obvious example.  A state may also emphasize domestic security over international issues 
due to the threat environment.  The following chapter will use this model as a general 
guide as it looks at each country’s intelligence community.  With this model the purpose 
is to determine if each country has these basic mechanisms of oversight in place, and if 
they have they have at least some form of competitive analysis to produce good, well 
rounded intelligence products, thus making their community a valuable coalition partner 
in combating terrorism within the region.  
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III. THE DILEMMA OF OVERSIGHT VS. EFFICIENCY APPLIED 
TO THE TRI-BORDER AREA 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine how dilemma of oversight vs. efficiency 
as outlined in the previous chapter applies to the Tri-Border Area case.  This chapter will 
examine the national intelligence agencies of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and look at 
how they are performing under democratic control, and how they compare to the ideal 
type model developed in Chapter II.  Community structures will be examined to 
determine if they have all-source agencies that can bring in competitive and varied 
viewpoints to the policymakers.  Assets will also be examined to determine how effective 
their collection capabilities are.  In regard to oversight, Legislation will be reviewed to 
determine if there is effective congressional oversight, and if permanent select 
committees exist.  Executive and internal agency oversight structures will also be 
compared.  Finally, media reports regarding each country’s intelligence agency will be 
reviewed to determine if the media is a genuine oversight tool; and they will also be an 
indicator of what abuses the intelligence agencies have committed, if any. Each country 
case study will conclude with a summarization of how close to the ideal type model their 
intelligence community is, and a ranking of their politicization based on Keller’s 
classification.  
 The chapter will conclude with a brief examination of existing multilateral 
organizations within the region that have begun to share information and coordinate 
efforts to combat terrorism.  Each organization and its counter-terrorism initiatives will 
be examined to determine their strengths and weaknesses in its overall contribution to the 
effort.  The purpose of this examination is to determine which organizations are most 
effective and warrant support and assistance from the United States to help its counter-
terrorism efforts first and foremost, but also to assist these organizations in their goal of 
regional security for the Tri-Border Area. 
 All of the countries share significant similarities and differences.  All three 
countries emerged from authoritarian regimes in which security intelligence was a key 
tool of regime repression.  In each country, all of the intelligence branches had internal 
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missions, either exclusively, or in addition to traditional missions, and the communities 
as a whole acted as political, or regime police.54  Juan Rial uses the term poder 
moderador55 to describe the attitude of Latin American militaries prior to 
democratization, whose purpose was to defend the constitution, even from what was 
perceived as squabbling or corrupt and incompetent civilian politicians.  All three 
countries participated in the infamous Operation Condor56 in the 1970’s in which 
intelligence was shared in an effort to better track down and persecute dissidents.  In 
some cases dissidents were also extradited and “disappeared” within regimes. 
 However, each country came back under democratic control in a different way, 
and therefore, each has different levels of control over their intelligence apparatus, and 
each apparatus is at a different level of ability.  Thus for the United States to prescribe 
good policy on intelligence and information sharing to combat the emerging threat of 
terrorism within the Tri-Border Area, it must understand how effective the agencies are, 
and how responsive to oversight they have become. 
  
A. ARGENTINA 
 Argentina has been under uninterrupted democratic control the longest of the 
three countries, and is arguably the most consolidated democracy within the group.     
This is due to the fact that the military authoritarian regime fell from power in disgrace 
after the Falklands/Malvinas defeat, and suffered a significant loss of legitimacy with the 
people. Therefore firm civilian democratic control was able to come into power, and a 
power-sharing or caretaker transition commonly seen when military regimes cede power 
and still yield influence, was avoided.57 Firm control was translated into reform of the 
military and the intelligence community.  This desire to transform the intelligence 
community stems primarily from the history of the “Dirty War” of the 1970’s, in which 
                                                 
54 Gill, pp. 60-61 
55 Juan Rial, “Armies and Civil Society in Latin America” from Civil-Military Relations and 
Democracy ed. Diamond and Plattner (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) p. 50 
56 The New York Times, June 9, 2000 p. A10 
57 David Pion-Berlin & Craig Arceneux, “Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and Human 
Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile” from Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 31 No. 5 
(October 1998) pp. 643-645 
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Argentina became arguably the most infamous country in South America in regards to 
civil and human rights abuses by its security agencies and military.  Now it has the most 
reformed and publicly accessible intelligence community within the group.  Oversight 
has been explicitly injected at all levels to ensure the community serves its policymakers 
for the tasks intended, and it generally remains responsive to civilian control.  There have 
been some cases of backsliding though, as will be discussed below.   
The Argentine intelligence community is much like that of the United States (see 
figure 2). 58  It has three main all-source agencies, coordinated by a National Intelligence 
Center (CNI).  This center is the primary coordinating apparatus for the community and 
gathers data from all of the intelligence agencies.  The central agency within the 
community is the State Intelligence Secretary (SIDE), which is a civilian agency within 
the executive branch, much like the CIA.  A key difference though, is that SIDE has both 
external and internal intelligence functions, to include counter-espionage.   
The Ministry of Defense controls and coordinates the intelligence of all three 
branches of the military.  The National Defense Law of 1992 decreed that military 
intelligence was not to be internally focused.  This is evidenced in the military’s 
peacekeeping and force projection operations since democratization to include 
participating in the Gulf War, and operations in Haiti, and the Balkans.  A further 
indicator of this trend has been the dissolution of the Army’s Battalion 601, which was a 
notorious part of the state security intelligence apparatus in the “Dirty War”. 59  Yet there 
are indicators that internal oversight is lacking.  There was a scandal in Cordoba in 1999, 
when a judge discovered army intelligence was conducting surveillance on persons 
involved in a trial stemming from abuses committed during the Dirty War, in clear 
violation of the 1992 law. 60  
The Ministry of the Interior controls the state security intelligence apparatus 
through two primary intelligence agencies within the National Gendarmerie (Federal 
                                                 
58 Eduardo Estevez, “Argentina’s Intelligence After Ten Years of Democracy: The Challenge of 
Reform and Congressional Oversight” (http://www.fas.org./irp/world/argentina/estevez.htm) accessed May 
29, 2002. 
59 J. Patrice McSherry, “Argentina: Dismantling an authoritarian legacy” NACLA Report on the 
Americas vol 33 issue 5 (New York, Mar/Apr 2000) [ProQuest Database] p. 1  
60 Ibid. p. 2 
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Paramilitary Police), and the Coast Guard (PNA); and also a small agency within the 
National Police. Thus the country’s security agencies are also responsible for low 
policing.61  In regards to efficiency vs. oversight in domestic intelligence, arguments can 
be made for both separate and combined agencies that also have a police role.  In the case 
of oversight, though it is easier to combine police and security intelligence.  Gill argues 
that separating police and security intelligence may prevent it from having the tools to 
become a political police force, but it also runs the risk of the police simply growing 
another “intelligence head”; one that may be hidden from oversight mechanisms, as 
occurred in Canada with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.62  
The first mechanism of external oversight was established in 1992 with a Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Internal Security63 within Congress.  In addition to the 
oversight committee, congress has sought to control the intelligence budget.  This was a 
major undertaking, since several government departments maintained secret accounts, 
even after democratization.  Success in control over the budget seems to be marginal.  At 
first eight of ten secret accounts were eliminated. However this trend has been reversed 
somewhat, and secret accounts grew again to four, to include SIDE and the executive.64 
Additionally, judicial oversight is exercised through the “Information and Intelligence 
Control Law”65 which established a judicial observation office that helps oversee 
intelligence issues such as intercepts, and establishes penalties for violating the law in 
this regard.   
Evidence of political policing has occurred on two occasions that caught media 
attention.  The first event after the passing of the Internal Security Law66 was in 1993, 
when the Gendarmerie was discovered to be conducting what was called “ideological 
                                                 
61 Low policing is a term that also refers to a federal agency that has law enforcement capacity.  An 
example of an agency with intelligence and high policing would be the FBI in the United States.  It does 
not have a uniformed police arm.  
62 Gill. pp. 213-214 
63 Estevez, p. 7 
64 Ibid. p. 5 
65 Ibid. p. 11 
66 Ibid. p. 7 
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surveillance” of Argentine citizens in Buenos Aries.67  This led to a Congressional bill 
that charged the intelligence agencies with developing mechanisms of internal oversight. 
It specifically prohibited intelligence agencies from collecting information on the basis of 
race, culture, political affiliations, etc. and it ordered the agencies to “adopt those 
measures necessary to assure that the prohibition stated in this article is in force.”68  
It is argued that this attempt to mandate mechanisms of internal oversight was a 
good start but may have been too vague and not well supervised, as evidenced in both 
1996, when the Gendarmerie was again embroiled in a domestic surveillance scandal 
involving shantytown dwellers and priests, and 1999 with the Army’s case in Cordoba. 69  
Thus the most important mechanism of oversight remains the media.  In 
Argentina this has been the true watchdog against the reemergence of a regime police. 
Just as important, has been the congressional response to the media’s vigilance.  It has 
continued to enact legislation to improve formal oversight and control mechanisms to 
ensure the Argentine intelligence agencies remain responsive to democracy.   
Therefore, in relation to Keller’s classification, Argentina’s security intelligence 
would be considered to be a domestic intelligence bureau with oversight established at 
the internal, executive, assembly, and public levels. In the debate of efficiency vs. 
oversight, the model Argentina has chosen actually favors oversight over efficiency.  This 
can be argued by the fact that Argentina is willing to risk political policing by keeping 
domestic intelligence within its national police and coast guard.  They have considered 
this risk better than separating intelligence and policing, and the chance that the police 
agencies will grow new, unmonitored intelligence heads.   
In relation to efficiency within the ideal type model, Argentina seems to have 
adopted a good structure of competitive all-source intelligence agencies.  Efficiency has 
suffered though.  Argentina has been victim to two terrorist bombings on its soil within 
the span of two years (1992-1994), which exhibits a repeated intelligence failure. This 
could be a result of misdirected intelligence efforts.  This is evidenced in the implication 
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of Argentine police officers in the bombing, and the judges mishandling of evidence in 
the subsequent trial. As evidenced above, the formal oversight mechanisms are in place; 
yet there is room to improve both oversight and control at the internal level.  More recent 
indicators of the need to improve efficiency have come from criticisms by the Argentine 
minister of defense, who stated that Argentine intelligence data is not disseminated across 
different agencies, thus information sharing is deficient.70 SIDE reinforced this criticism 
when they mentioned that interconnectivity between agencies hinders intelligence sharing 
during a subsequent interview with La Nacion after the minister of defense’s comments 
to the legislature.71  Finally, Brazil has also been critical of this lack of connectivity, and 
stated that it hindered regional intelligence cooperation within the Tri-Border Area as 
recently as September 2002.72 
One of the most encouraging things for Argentina is that intelligence remains in 
the national conscience and is a priority among lawmakers, something that is all too 
uncommon for Latin America.  The new National Intelligence Law, written in 2001, is 
the best example.73  Argentina is the only country in the group that has made intelligence 
priority within its legislature.  The law has encouraging aspects, such as specific 
prohibitions on gathering intelligence for political purposes listed in Article 4.  Also 
Article 10 gives specific guidance to the roles and missions of military intelligence.  
Additionally, fiscal oversight and control of the intelligence community by the 
parliamentary oversight committees is also addressed in the law.  This is important, since 
it was a major deficiency addressed by Eduardo Estevez’ analysis in 1993.   
However, the law is not perfect.  As Jose Manuel Ugarte argues in his analysis of 
the law, SIDE still has responsibility for both external and internal intelligence.  Most 
experts argue this separation is one of the pre-requisites for community oversight.74The 
                                                 
70 La Nacion, (Buenos Aires) 20 September 2001 [FBIS database]  
71 La Nacion (Buenos Aires), 23 September 2001 [FBIS database] 
72 Porto Alegre Zero Hora (Port Alegre), 9 September 2002 [FBIS database] 
73 For a copy of the law and an analysis of it by Jose Manuel Ugarte, see the FAS intelligence website 
at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/argentina/index.html accessed 28 October 2002 
74 Both Peter Gill and Mark Lowenthal argue this is a major issue with intelligence community 
oversight in their works cited above in Chapter Two. This returns to the issue of separate roles and missions 
for strategic intelligence and internal security intelligence under different sections of the executive branch 
within the ideal type community model. 
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ideal type intelligence model in Chapter II supports this argument, with internal security 
intelligence being the exclusive domain of the ministry of interior.  Another issue that 
Ugarte brings to light is the law’s failure to give specific definitions as to what constitutes 
threats to internal security within the country.  This is a good point, but also can be a 
double-edged sword.  The argument is that by being as specific as possible, one makes 
stringent oversight easier.  However one may also hamstring the agency’s execution of its 
duties.  A good example is the FBI’s current struggle over the issue of monitoring 
mosques as meeting places for terrorists. To do this could be seen as a violation against 
religious freedom; however terrorists could easily use this restriction to their advantage, 
and make a mosque a planning and coordination cell.  Therefore, I argue the importance 
of internal agency oversight, with judicial review.  The key issue is to ensure the agency 
has sufficient probable cause to conduct surveillance that may impinge upon civil 
liberties such as freedom of religion.  The danger is not to allow a “blanket” clause based 
on previous successes justifying a continued practice of a certain technique.  Each case 
should come under new scrutiny and review by the oversight agencies in place to ensure 
the reasons are appropriate for any extraordinary measures to be used.  Obviously this 
argument hinges on the existence of both adequate and effective internal oversight and 
judicial review mechanisms within the intelligence community.      
In sum, Argentina needs to improve efficiency by improving internal oversight 
measures to ensure appropriate intelligence targets are being identified, and develop 
better database connectivity to improve information sharing across agencies.  An 
encouraging sign is the Argentine Legislature sees intelligence oversight as a major issue.  
Even prior to September 11th, the new Argentine Intelligence Law was being debated in 
Congress.  One of the most heated issues was roles and missions, with the issue of the 
military conducting domestic intelligence to increase efficiency.  This debate was 
renewed after September 11th, but the amendment did not pass.  This seems to be a good 
step for the Argentine Intelligence community.  Adding military intelligence to domestic 
intelligence would actually complicate the matter even more.  It would add three more 
agencies to the mix.  Argentina’s focus right now should be to get better information 
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sharing within its existing domestic civilian intelligence network within the SIDE and the 
networks of the Federal Police, National Gendarmerie, and Coast Guard. 
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B. BRAZIL 
Brazil’s transition to democracy differed significantly from Argentina.  It was a 
slow process from 1974 to 1985 under a caretaker military regime that ensured the 
military’s purview in domestic matters would remain intact.  It also ensured that there 
were no radical changes in the military or security apparatus such as occurred in 
neighboring Argentina.  This was due to the fact that the military retained its power, and 
still commanded the respect of the people, thus it controlled the transition to democracy.  
One indicator of this fact is time that it took to disband the security intelligence apparatus 
known as the SNI (National Information Service). This agency was a true regime police, 
and it was on the verge of becoming an independent security state.  It was so powerful, 
that it continued to operate with virtual autonomy from the government for five years 
after democratization, to include political surveillance and even vetting bureaucratic 
appointments.75  It was not until President Collor built a coalition of popular opposition 
to the agency, that the congress found enough courage to challenge and abolish it.76 
The Brazilian Intelligence Community is primarily divided among the military 
intelligence agencies within the Ministry of Defense, and a civilian Brazilian Intelligence 
Agency (ABIN) under an Institutional Security Cabinet.  Additionally, the Minister of 
Justice has a domestic intelligence capability within the National Police (see figure 3).   
The ABIN is the successor to the old SNI, however with some significant changes 
and mandates.  The most significant is its smaller size, and the fact it does not penetrate 
society like the old SNI that maintained branch offices in every public building and 
university, and had the authority to consider almost all aspects of Brazilian life issues of 
national security.77  The Brazilian government has made a great deal of effort to sell the 
ABIN as a benign intelligence agency concerned with primarily external security 
interests, and counter-espionage.  The first director evidences this in his statement when 
the ABIN was created that it should have a “deep ethical sense inherent to the production 
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of information and to full respect for democratic rules.” 78 Yet there have been complaints 
from Brazil’s Muslim community about the ABIN conducting inappropriate domestic 
surveillance.79 Additionally, the director of the ABIN was dismissed by the Cardoso 
government for other domestic surveillance abuses to include surveillance on such 
organizations as Greenpeace and Americas Watch.80  Thus is seems the Brazilian 
government is still struggling with control over its new civilian agency, as it tries to 
emerge from the shadow of the SNI. 
The Brazilian military considers itself above internal security issues, with border 
security along the Amazon excepted.  Brazil is a major world power, and therefore 
projects its military as such.  Thus it is paradoxical that all of the service intelligence 
branches remain highly politicized and focused on internal surveillance.  Cepik and 
Antunes note that this internal politicization has ranged from vetting their own officers in 
legitimate issues of corruption, to their naval intelligence actually investigating which 
congressmen would be more apt to support naval interests. Unfortunately the navy has 
gone even farther and is alleged to have conducted surveillance on the Landless People 
Movement  (MST) to include infiltration even as late as 1997.81   In 1999, all of the 
service branches came under a ministry of defense; however it remains unclear how 
successful the effort of redirecting military intelligence to appropriate military concerns 
has been.  This is evidenced in the fact that the branch chiefs still direct their intelligence 
service collection priorities.  A recent study by Jorge Zavarucha on the situation provides 
ample evidence that the Brazilian army is still conducting domestic surveillance of leftist 
groups, primarily the MST. 82  It also argues that oversight of the military intelligence 
apparatus is clearly ineffective.  A story released by Folha de Sao Paulo reporting that 
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army intelligence documents were found alleging that it was still spying on domestic 
groups also supports this argument. 83  
Therefore in regard to internal oversight mechanisms, it is apparent that even if 
Inspector General positions exist within the agencies, they are likely to be figureheads. In 
regard to executive oversight, the President does have a cabinet on Institutional Security, 
which is in the ABIN’s chain of command. The issue is complicated, and likely due to the 
military intelligence community having filled a vacuum during the absence of a central 
intelligence organization.  This occurred between the disbandment of the SNI, and the 
formation of the ABIN.  During this time it appears that military intelligence took on the 
role of internal security intelligence since no other agency existed with this responsibility.  
The problem is that the military intelligence community has not been given clear 
guidance as to what their intelligence mission is, and the ABIN has yet to assert itself as 
the central intelligence agency within Brazil. Thus clear roles and missions must be 
delineated; and oversight mechanisms must be installed to ensure that the appropriate 
agencies are conducting the appropriate types of intelligence.  This will require 
congressional oversight. 
Until quite recently, congressional oversight has been somewhat sporadic.  
Antunes and Cepik argue that legislators had been rather indifferent about intelligence 
oversight since democratization.84 This is a common problem since intelligence oversight 
does not bring tangible benefits to a legislator’s constituency.  Initially policymakers 
were divided over disbanding the SNI.85  Many had suffered under SNI, and opposition 
existed, but there was not a national outcry, as in Argentina, until Collor built the 
opposition and turned SNI excesses into a major policy issue as part of his platform.  No 
separate Intelligence Oversight Committees were created, leaving this task to the Defense 
Committees in each house.86This is very problematic since defense matters would take 
precedence, and it poses a greater risk of co-option, especially in regard to overseeing the 
defense intelligence agencies.  The latest intelligence law in 1999 proposed separate 
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oversight committees, but experts feel it will be some time before these are ratified, due 
to poor congressional performance on intelligence issues in the past.87Others such as 
Zaverucha support this argument by showing that congressional oversight of the military 
has clearly failed.88 In addition to oversight, Congress does not have a firm grasp on the 
budget.  This was evidenced by the fact that when presented with a budgetary proposal 
for the ABIN, Congress did not know what amount was even sufficient for the agency to 
function.89  
Judicial oversight was enacted, but the 1999 law has been criticized for being very 
vague in regard to what the intelligence community can actually do, or to whom the 
community is accountable.  Secondly it does not even define the community very well.  
Finally it does not reinforce congressional oversight by clearly delineating supervision 
and reporting mechanisms.90 
The media or public oversight mechanism seems fairly open.  Liberal papers such 
as Folha de Sao Paulo are regularly covering stories of human rights issues and are 
openly critical of the government. Amnesty international also seems to have open access.  
As evidenced by the stories above, the media seems to be an effective “whistle blower” 
like that of Argentina.  Even finding sources such as Zaverucha reinforce this fact.  
Though some may find issue with his objectivity on the subject, the fact that he can 
openly criticize his country’s intelligence community is important.  This type of criticism 
would have been unheard of under the SNI. The problem stems from the fact that the 
government has been slow to enact any real meaningful reforms in the intelligence 
community besides dismissing directors.  Even more interesting is the fact that when the 
ABIN was previewed in the media in 1996, the new director was very explicit in telling 
the public about the agency’s level of penetration in society stating that, “every 
instrument authorized by the courts will be used to keep the president informed, including 
wiretapping of phones, opening of personal mail, and infiltration of ABIN agents into 
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social movements such as the MST.”91  This is very odd since the old director was fired 
by the president for disagreeing with the secretary-general’s view on the new agency of 
which he stated should not be conducting such operations as wiretapping phones!92 
Up until November 2002, this would be an accurate picture of the Brazilian 
intelligence community.  However recent progress has been made within the Congress to 
establish meaningful oversight of the intelligence community.  The Naval Postgraduate 
School of Monterey, California’s Center For Civil Military Relations has been working 
with the Brazilian Congress to develop intelligence oversight committees.93  This is a 
major step, and it is encouraging to know that Brazil acknowledges the shortcomings 
within its community, and the need for effective oversight mechanisms.  Unfortunately 
this thesis is being written during this very important process, and the subject must be 
revisited to determine how effective this development within congress has been.   
Brazil is going in the right direction toward the ideal type community model, but 
until these mechanisms are in place and working, oversight has not been effectively 
established.  Thus, in relation to Keller’s classification the Brazilian intelligence 
community would be best described as a political police.  Significant progress has been 
and continues to be made since the SNI was disbanded, but effective formal oversight 
mechanisms remain in development.  It will be interesting to see what success the 
Brazilian Congress has, especially in regard to assigning pertinent missions to defense 
intelligence, and subordinating the community to civilian control with the help of an 
effective oversight committee.  Ironically, the community would seem quite efficient due 
to all of its agencies’ high level of penetration within society, and lack of regulation.  The 
question is that until these reforms are successfully completed, whether the community 
will experience an intelligence failure by focusing on subversive movements instead of 
more legitimate threats such as terrorists and narco-traffickers.  
In relation to the ideal type model, Brazil has three main branches, with excellent 
collection capabilities but they are all more or less internally focused, thus affecting 
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overall efficiency.  Brazil’s intelligence infrastructure is modern and very capable.  This 
is evidenced by the new SIVAM over the horizon surveillance radar being put into 
operation in the Amazon region.  The problem is that the community as a whole needs to 
have its roles and missions properly defined and effective controls put into place to 
ensure agencies are responsive to government.  Specifically this entails (1) establishing 
meaningful congressional oversight, and (2) giving the military intelligence community 
new direction and properly subordinating it under the minister of defense.   
In the area of effectiveness, Brazil has recently developed a state-level approach 
to improve its collection and analytic capability.  Federal money is being used to set up 
ten intelligence collection centers for state police within ten of its border states.  This is to 
address what has been a chief criticism of the state level security forces: lack of 
information.94  This seems to be a step in the right direction, since it decentralizes 
collection responsibilities, thus breaking up a huge task into smaller pieces.  Additionally 
it is encouraging to see that these centers are under civilian control.  What remains to be 
seen is how effectively these centers will be able to send up information for national 
analysis, and share information between other agencies both at state and federal levels. 
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C. PARAGUAY 
Paraguay has been the greatest challenge in the research.  It was the last to 
democratize in 1989, and unlike Argentina and Brazil, which had corporate type 
authoritarian regimes; Paraguay was under the iron hand of a single dictator, General 
Alfredo Stroessner, from 1954-1989.  Thus it was also the country under the longest 
uninterrupted period of authoritarian rule as well.  This has led to great difficulty in 
finding information regarding Paraguay’s intelligence community, and some of it is 
admittedly speculative.  Paraguay’s democratization has been very rocky.  It is the least 
consolidated among the three, with a coup attempt resulting in the assassination of the 
vice president as late as 1999.95All branches of Paraguay’s government are viewed as 
highly corrupt.  President Macchi was nearly impeached for corruption in 2001, and it is 
common knowledge that criminals have been able to buy their way out of the judicial 
system.   
Paraguay’s intelligence community remains a bit of a mystery at this time (see 
figure 4).  It is assumed that all branches of the military have their intelligence branches, 
but their capabilities and functions are probably quite limited in a military of only about 
12,000 personnel.  Secondly it is unclear as to how inwardly focused Paraguay’s military 
intelligence is, but evidence suggests this is the case.  A letter submitted by an army 
officer to human rights lawyer Martin Almada, alleges that the Paraguayan army was 
sharing lists of subversives with the Ecuadorean army, thus smacking of the type of 
intelligence information sharing during Operation Condor. 96   
The national police have a domestic intelligence branch. This organization has a 
long history as a regime police under the Stroessner dictatorship, in which much of the 
repression and human rights abuse can be attributed to this organization.97  Thus it can be 
assumed its intelligence service was highly politicized.98  Under democratization little 
evidence of reform has been seen, in regards to the national police apparatus.  The 
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political situation still remains unstable.  Part of the problem is that legitimate threats to 
the regime still exist. The recent coup attempt is still fresh in everyone’s memory, and the 
Colorado political party maintains its own paramilitary militia.  Though poorly armed, 
even by Paraguayan Army standards, their numbers are estimated to be about 100,000,99 
thus ten times the size of the national police, and nearly five times larger than the military 
and police combined.    
Until recently, Paraguay also had a civilian state intelligence agency.  It was 
known as the National Intelligence Secretariat or SNI, as in Brazil.  However a recent 
report released by the government announced its intention to disband the agency due to 
lack of public trust in “national security agencies”.100 This was in the wake of a major 
scandal regarding the abduction of two left-wing activists by supposed vigilantes with 
ties to the government.  The scandal resulted in the resignations of the ministers of the 
interior and of justice and labor, a combined post.  Once again, impeachment proceedings 
against President Macchi were also discussed.101  It remains unclear whether the police 
intelligence service will remain intact. 
In relation to oversight, the only truly effective mechanism seems to be the media, 
which has been very open in Paraguay. Due to its vigilance, it has brought the 
government to task on several occasions.  In relation to congressional oversight, no 
formal mechanisms seem to exist; yet there has been discussion of sending a bill to 
Congress to legislate how an intelligence agency should operate.  This, at least is a step in 
the right direction.  Additionally, legislators are not afraid to raise the debate in congress, 
and most importantly, the recent scandals have made intelligence oversight a policy issue 
of importance among lawmakers. 
It is unrealistic to think that Paraguay with its highly volatile political situation 
will not have an intelligence community. Unfortunately until the government can get its 
house in order, and the high levels of corruption subdued, all services that are created will 
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be political police at the very least, or will become even worse repression tools of the 
regime in power.  
In relation to the ideal type model, Paraguay is the furthest from the mark.  If the 
central intelligence agency was disbanded, it has no all-source analysis center of any real 
capability.  The military intelligence is probably of an appropriate level for the country’s 
armed forces, but most likely requires equipment modernization and better training.  The 
domestic security intelligence system is most likely very highly politicized.  This 
politicization has produced a lack of trust by other intelligence agencies within the region 
and hinders the sharing of information.  Comments by the members of the Brazilian 
intelligence community in a recent interview regarding cooperation with other agencies 
in the Tri Border Area illustrate this point: 
 
Agents of the Brazilian Intelligence system…. believe the 
Paraguayan intelligence service to be the most problematic, due to an 
explosive mixture: corruption among agents and a hurry to produce 
results.  “It is hard to know if the content of the Paraguayans’ information 
is true or just fiction” explains one Brazilian agent.102  
   
Thus until Paraguay is able to make progress on the root cause of systemic corruption, its 
legitimacy will remain suspect.   
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Paraguay 0**   HUMINT, 
SIGINT 
No No 
*Defense intelligence was not included due to fact that Minister of Defense does 
not direct a coordinated intel effort among each branch of military. 
** Assumes defense has basic collection capabilities and central agency (SNI) 
was actually disbanded as reported. 
 
D. MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS AND COOPERATIVE 
AGREEMENTS 
 
The next area to discuss is what organizations and agreements are in place within 
the Tri-Border Area to share intelligence information to combat terrorism, and what 
deficiencies exist within those organizations and agreements.  The scope of this thesis 
includes the following multilateral organizations: The Organization of American States 
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(OAS), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Inter-American Committee Against 
Terrorism (CICTE), and The Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur).   
 
1. Organization of American States (OAS) 
The OAS’ most recent contribution toward gaining a consensus among its 34 
members toward combating terrorism was arguably its most effective.  Until recently, the 
OAS has been seen by some analysts as quite ineffective at mustering international 
cooperation and agreement among its members. Viron Vaky, Chairman of the Study 
Group on Western Hemispheric Governance in 1997 stated: 
 
Currently the OAS does not have the capacity to play the kind of 
hub role we argue it should have—not for any intrinsic or organic reason, 
but because of the absence of political consensus among member 
governments about what the organization should be and what it should 
do.104 
 
This has been due primarily to issues of nationalism, and concerns from major 
powers such as Brazil about being subjected to supranational controls and constraints.  
Additionally, the OAS has been subordinate to U.S. interests since its inception, thus the 
United States has not encouraged its development, especially to be a regional body that 
might offer policy independent of the United States.  Finally, the member nations of the 
OAS have a long history of respecting national sovereignty above all things.   This has 
made cooperative multilateral agreements problematic since most countries have strong 
reservations about interfering in a neighbor’s internal affairs.   
That being said, the OAS sponsored “Inter-American Convention Against 
Terrorism”105 has been a significant step in the right direction.  First, it includes all of the 
UN anti-terrorism conventions, to include the most recent and most controversial, that of 
suppressing the financing of terrorist activities.  The convention not only spells out what 
a signer of this treaty is obligated to do to combat terrorism, it also gives clear standards 
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105 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism 3 June 2002. Available [Online] 
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as to what a country must do to effectively perform these functions.  For example, it 
explicitly states in Article 4 that each nation will establish financial intelligence units to 
better track money flows and stem those flows from terrorist organizations.  It also 
appoints the South American Financial Action Task Force as the regional organization to 
ensure states are both compliant, and have adequate systems in place to monitor and 
interdict these flows. Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay are among the nations who have 
signed this agreement, however, neighboring Uruguay has not due to concerns over its 
banking secrecy laws.  This convention is an excellent start that gives participating 
nations a common standard of expectations toward combating terrorism.  Its weakness is 
it lacks language on sharing intelligence information.  Article 8 simply mentions that 
states need to cooperate and establish channels of communication to facilitate 
information exchanges.  No organization or agency is appointed to coordinate or facilitate 
the collection and exchange of information beyond national levels. 
 
2. Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) 
 This is a committee within the OAS that was established at the Mar Del Plata 
Conference on Terrorism in 1998.  Its purpose is to foster greater cooperation among 
member nations to combat terrorism, specifically in the areas of information exchange, 
border, and financial controls.106 It is primarily a forum to hold meetings on international 
terrorism develop better regional cooperation initiatives, and to determine issues that 
might hinder cooperation, and find solutions to overcome those issues.  One concrete 
goal is to establish an Inter-American Terrorism Database.  This database is a good step 
to help nations share open source intelligence that has been collected, but is no substitute 
for a true intelligence analysis center, that can collect information on transnational threats 
from countries, process and analyze it, and provide a good regional picture that will allow 
countries to be more proactive in combating terrorist threats. 
 The strength of this committee is it meets annually to push forward antiterrorism 
legislation adopted by the OAS.  This is important, since it was previously noted that 
though the OAS has had success in developing inter American cooperative treaties, and 
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agreements on terrorism and sharing information, implementation of these agreements 
tends to linger due to the OAS concern for national sovereignty and its hesitation to be 
adopted as a more forceful instrument in ensuring countries comply with the agreements 
adopted.  Thus the CICTE is a good forum for specific countries to raise concerns about 
terrorism issues they are facing, and to ask for support and assistance in combating 
terrorism. 
 The CICTE is focused on hemispheric initiatives, such as its database 
development initiative.  This is good for some issues, but it may also be problematic, and 
sacrifice effectiveness at this level.  A good example is Mexico signing the Inter-
American Convention Against Terrorism with a caveat for the right to asylum of political 
prisoners.107  This means that Mexico will decide issues of extradition on a case-by-case 
basis, and therefore may not extradite wanted terrorists.  Another example is Uruguay not 
signing the convention due to financial secrecy concerns as mentioned above.  Thus one 
can get a “watered down” resolution by trying to include all of the players at a certain 
level.  These examples reinforce the argument for building the cooperative agreement, 
and especially the mechanisms to facilitate that cooperation at the regional level.  The 
issue then becomes trading off multilateral inclusion for effective cooperation, and 
finding the right mix of both.  This issue will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 
Four. 
 In sum, the CICTE is a good hemispheric forum for countries to raise issues 
regarding terrorism, propose legislation on terrorism, and seek advice and assistance from 
other countries.  Its limitations are in building actual mechanisms to share information 
and directly combat terrorism, due to the varying perceptions about the terrorist threats 
within the hemisphere, and attitudes towards cooperation.   
 
3. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
The regional FATF for South America is a branch of the original FATF that 
evolved from the G7 summit in Paris in 1989.  It goes by the acronym GAFISUD.  It is 
                                                 
107 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, see Declarations, Reservations, Renunciations, and 
Withdrawals. 
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headquartered in Buenos Aires, and its membership is Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.  Argentina and Brazil are the only 
members of the primary FATF, and have thus received certification by other members as 
effective states that have systems in place to combat money laundering, including 
financial intelligence networks.108 Based on these evaluations both Argentina and Brazil 
were considered to have good legislation and capable agencies in place to track money 
laundering.   
Two issues of concern exist.  The first is this FATF certification seems geared 
towards narcotics money laundering.  Brazil has been very cooperative, even despite 
banking secrecy laws, however the Brazilian government may be much less willing to 
track money flows of Muslim or Islamic organizations due to its large, and well 
integrated Middle Eastern population.  This type of activity could trigger schisms within 
this ethnic population, something that the Brazilian government is very sensitive to.  This 
issue is discussed in further detail in Chapter IV.  The second issue is that Paraguay is not 
a member of the original FATF nations, and has not received the same certification as 
Argentina and Brazil from a parent agency or group of peers.  Thus the country where 
most of the money laundering in the area occurs, and according to some sources equals 
its Gross Domestic Product of $8 billion,109 remains below the capabilities of its 
neighbors in tracking and preventing it.  This needs to be the primary task of GAFISUD, 
to bring countries like Paraguay and Uruguay to the same level of capability as the major 
regional partners such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.  This will require external funding; 
something that Argentina is incapable of at present, and Brazil probably unwilling to do.  
In addition to increasing a country’s ability to track money laundering, 
transparency in general must increase.  A good report card is Transparency 
International’s “Corruption Perception Index” (CPI).110  This organization conducts 
surveys that provide indicators on how corrupt people perceive their governments to be, 
                                                 
108 Financial Action Task Force website. Available [Online] 
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/Members_en.htm accessed July 8, 2002 
109 Deutsche Presse-Argentur, October 2, 2001 [Lexis Nexis Database] 
110 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, available [Online] 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html accessed August 28, 2002 
   53
and gives that country a numerical ranking.  Since corruption is a major obstacle to 
thwarting terrorism financing, a regional organization such as GAFISUD should use the 
CPI as a stick to get a country to improve its corruption levels.  An example of this is if a 
country is perceived as very corrupt, and has a history of money laundering, the 
GAFISUD could set annual targets for the country to meet based on the CPI.  If those 
targets are not met, it may affect IMF loans, and other aid the country seeks from the 
international community.         
 
4. The Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) 
 Mercosur developed as a regional financial market to compete with other world 
financial markets such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The 
member countries are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay who form the bloc 
nations.  Chile and Bolivia are associate members.  This thesis argues that Mercosur has 
the potential to fill a crucial gap in South America’s ability to combat terrorism; at least 
in regards to economic intelligence.  Mercosur emergence as a regional intelligence 
collection and analysis agency would give the countries in the Tri-Border Area the 
multilateral intelligence information sharing that is required to effectively attack terrorist 
money laundering organizations.  The fact that it is a financial organization, and not a 
military intelligence network supports the argument that the intelligence organization 
should be civilian in nature.  Also its financial background makes it most suitable for the 
threat that it faces.  As was established in Chapter I, money laundering and financing 
organizations such as Hezbollah have been the primary terrorist activities within the 
region. 
 The fact is Mercosur is already well on its way to becoming a regional 
intelligence information sharing center for its member countries.  In June of 2000, the 
Mercosur bloc countries decided to create a shared intelligence network.  Estado de Sao 
Paulo noted it was formed initially as a police information sharing venture, to include 
identity cards to better control border traffic in the Tri-Border Area. 111  This initial 
formation had difficulties when Argentina wanted to also include information sharing on 
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terrorists.112Other member countries were concerned this could lead to abuses, such as 
sharing information for political purposes.  This concern came in light of distant 
memories of the last time these countries conducted an intelligence information-sharing 
venture, the infamous Operation Condor.  Brazil even conducted some of the discussions 
secretly due to concerns public reaction over this type of an agency.  Therefore, it seems 
that concern for the proper handling and use of the information generated by a Mercosur 
intelligence information service would seem to be a priority among all of the member 
countries, which is a reassuring sign.  This is a significant change in the attitudes of all of 
these governments from even fifteen years ago. 
Two key questions regarding Mercosur’s role as an intelligence center exist.  First 
how receptive are member countries to this plan, and will their cooperation with and 
subordination to this agency in regard to security issues be accepted by their 
policymakers?  Second, does this role include a comprehensive multilateral plan that 
shares economic intelligence?   
In answer to the first question, all member countries have signed the agreement.  
Thus, it seems there is a commitment to share information on terrorism, at least through 
Mercosur by all of the countries within the Tri-Border Area, though they cannot agree on 
what level of terrorism exists and the exact nature of the terrorist threat.  The two key 
players in the region, Argentina and Brazil even renewed their commitment to share 
information on terrorism as recently as last October.  President De la Rua of Argentina 
specifically stated that part of his agenda with President Cardoso was to “look into 
integrating their military and intelligence capabilities to combat terrorism and improve 
regional security.”113 Argentina is very receptive toward sharing information within 
Mercosur, and is supportive of its role as multilateral security cooperative body.114  In 
December, 2001 a Mercosur security group was formed under a security coordinator to 
coordinate antiterrorist efforts within the region.  It consists of two groups: a Special 
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Work Group (GTE) and Permanent Work Group (GTP) too coordinate antiterrorism 
efforts.  The GTE will be a political body and consist of deputy interior ministers from 
each Mercosur country to include associate members.  The GTP will be a permanent task 
force consisting of intelligence officers from each country.115  
In answer to the second question, it still remains to be seen how this new working 
group will operate.  Since Mercosur is first and foremost an economic forum, economic 
intelligence should naturally be a high priority.  The issues will be what can individual 
countries be able to contribute based on their economic intelligence capabilities, and how 
will issues such as banking secrecy laws affect what they bring to the table.  Also there 
will be the issue of these countries totally divergent opinions on what, if any terrorist 
threat within the region exists.  These opinions and attitudes will be explored in greater 
detail in Chapter IV.  
 In conclusion, the intelligence communities of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
are all at different levels of capability, politicization, and oversight (see tables 1 and 2).  
As the United States government deals with each country in an effort to foster greater 
cooperation in fighting international terrorism, these issues need to be kept in mind.  
First, policy needs to be carefully presented to ensure that intelligence assistance and 
cooperative efforts don’t simply help a country rebuild its regime police, as could easily 
be the case with Paraguay.  Second it needs to ensure the proper agencies are doing the 
mission.  For instance, with Brazil’s long history of politicized military intelligence, 
counter-terrorism assistance should be a civilian police issue, thus supporting a leading 
expert’s opinion in the field.116  This is especially true since there is no evidence of high 
levels of terrorist activity in that country yet.  The same strategy applies for Argentina.  
Thus cooperative bilateral efforts may be reached with the countries and genuine progress 
against terrorism can be made, while respect for democratic oversight is also maintained, 
or even improved. 
 The next area to consider is the role the existing multilateral agencies can play in 
the war on terrorism, and how they can be improved or better incorporated to help the 
                                                 
115 EFE News Service, December 1, 2001 [Global NewsBank] 
116 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London: Cass 2000) pp. 
102-105 
   56
both regionally and internationally. The last thing that needs to occur is to stand up 
another bureaucracy within these Latin American governments.  As this chapter has 
indicated, Mercosur is probably the best organization to form the basis of a multilateral 
economic intelligence center within the region.  The issue will be how the United States 
can assist this effort, and also benefit from the intelligence information it generates.  
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IV. UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA 
The previous chapter outlined the deficiencies within each country’s intelligence 
community in comparison to the “ideal type” community model.  It argued that 
information sharing between states is hindered by both the capabilities and the attitudes 
of each country involved.  Thus the question posed in this chapter is how has United 
States assistance and policy towards each country improved or hindered that country’s 
development toward an ideal type intelligence community model? This chapter examines 
current United States’ policy toward countries within the Tri-Border Area to determine if 
any specific initiatives are offered to improve intelligence networks and information 
sharing. Also, receptiveness by each country toward U.S. policy and assistance is 
examined.  This chapter argues that very little has been done toward building a 
multilateral cooperative effort to share intelligence, and that most of the assistance has 
been military aid to the armed forces and national police to directly address a current 
crisis such as terrorists and drug traffickers.  This assistance has had little foresight and 
does not address the underlying problem, but primarily the symptoms. An analogy would 
be giving cough medicine to a person suffering from tuberculosis.  
The argument is from the standpoint that intelligence assistance should be civilian 
in nature.  The emerging terrorist threat is not nearly as significant as in Colombia, for 
instance, and should be dealt with as an internal security matter.  United States policy 
therefore should be to improve intelligence communities within Latin America in both 
effectiveness and oversight.  This will establish standards of conduct and ability through 
increased professionalization.  In turn, this professionalization improves trust among 
different communities and facilitates greater mutual cooperation in sharing intelligence, 
thus increasing regional cooperation. The paper also argues that defense-related 
assistance does not necessarily have negative consequences, as long as it is for military 
professionalization; and not an attempt to co-opt South American militaries into an 
internally focused domestic security role.  This is a gray area and can quickly go down a 
“slippery slope” and must be closely managed.  For a country like Paraguay, this could 
spell disaster for its troubled democracy.  However, benefits may be gained if through 
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defense assistance other inroads can be made such as improving civilian infrastructure, 
and improving civilian control of the state security apparatus.    
Regarding U.S. aid and foreign policy, this chapter argues from the standpoint 
that Argentina has been quite receptive to U.S. assistance, and there has been success in 
bilateral intelligence sharing.  Yet current economic policy toward Argentina has 
significantly reduced U.S. popularity, which may impede future cooperation.  In regard to 
Brazil, the chapter argues that it has received the least amount of U.S. assistance of the 
three countries studies, and that Brazil’s policies remain largely independent of U.S. 
assistance influence.  Also, Brazil remains cautious toward U.S. policy with concerns that 
it might be trying to exercise hegemony within the region.  Finally, it will examine U.S. 
policy and Paraguay.  The thesis will argue that Paraguay remains the weakest link in the 
coalition, and U.S. aid has not really address Paraguay’s systemic problems such as weak 
government and rampant corruption.   
The chapter will conclude with an examination of the National Guard State 
Partnership Program and Paraguay.  Paraguay is the only State Partnership Program 
participant in the region.  It argues that the program is not suited to directly improve 
Paraguay’s ability to gather and share intelligence, but should focus on its primary role of 
civilian agency engagement.  Thus by improving Paraguay’s political, economic and 
social stability, it will make the country a more effective coalition partner with Argentina 
and Brazil. 
    
A. ARGENTINA 
Argentina has been the most cooperative country in sharing intelligence 
information with the United States regarding the Tri-Border Area.  The best example is 
the fact that shared intelligence information between Argentine and U.S. agencies was 
decisive in stopping an attempt to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Asuncion, Paraguay.117 In 
1999 the Argentine Minister of the Interior and director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation signed a counter terrorism agreement under a Justice Department initiative 
that included counter terrorism training for Argentine Police and Coast Guard agencies, 
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and building a joint database. 118  The U.S. State Department was part of this proactive 
measure, as then Secretary of State Madeline Albright commented on its progress during 
a press conference at the time the agreement was signed.  Even more significant was a 
meeting with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and his Argentine 
counterpart, director of the Secretariat for State Intelligence (SIDE).  Thus the top 
civilian intelligence agencies were also meeting to discuss counter terrorism issues.  As a 
bilateral agreement this sounded very promising because it showed that Argentina was 
both concerned about the emerging threat of terrorism, and was addressing it as a 
domestic security issue within the civilian realm.  This agreement also provided an 
excellent opportunity to deepen bilateral cooperation through training and joint exercises. 
However in 2001, a report from La Nacion stated that cooperation between the 
CIA and SIDE was suspended due to diplomatic problems. 119 Part of the reason for the 
falling out between the CIA and SIDE was resentment on the part of the SIDE against the 
CIA’s insistence that SIDE agents spy on the Russian embassy in Buenos Aires as part of 
their counter terrorism agreement.120  There were also accusations by the CIA that SIDE 
agents were shadowing their agents.  The bottom line is a lack of trust has developed 
between both agencies, and this will be hard to overcome. 
According to an interview with an Argentina analyst at the Defense Intelligence 
Agency though, cooperation with Argentine agencies still occurs.121 The emerging 
problem is more the fact that Argentine agencies are becoming internally focused on 
problems of domestic unrest due to the country’s financial solvency.122  Thus even 
though sources are available, there was not a great deal of information on terrorist 
activity within the Tri-Border Area to be gleaned, since it has become less of a priority 
with Argentina in its current crisis.  An article in Buenos Aires Economico from 2001 
confirmed this assessment when it noted at that time SIDE has been monitoring at least 
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110 potential domestic conflict situations within the country.123  Since then the situation 
has worsened, and one can imagine this effort has probably intensified. 
Department of Defense initiatives with Argentina have been effective in building 
a good working relationship with the United States.  In regard to military aid, Argentina 
has received equipment that has been primarily focused on its regular forces external 
missions, with emphasis on peacekeeping.124 This aid has been enhanced significantly 
with Argentina’s designation as a “major non-NATO ally”.  One can argue that through 
military cooperation and aid, the United States has both deepened Argentina’s 
democracy, and made Argentina very receptive to other areas of cooperation, such as 
counter-terrorism initiatives.  Argentina has been a staunch supporter of U.S. counter-
terrorism aid within the Southern Cone, even at the expense of being seen as too closely 
aligned with U.S. policy by other regional powers, such as Brazil.   
Therefore good bilateral cooperation should remain open to the United States 
such as when the plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Asuncion was foiled.  Also, these 
initiatives reinforce democracy in Argentina.  By improving military capabilities, 
Argentine forces remain externally focused, and pose less of a threat to democracy.  This 
is evidenced in the fact that they have remained in the barracks throughout the country’s 
economic crisis.  Another indicator of roles and missions becoming more clearly defined 
is the disbandment of Military Intelligence Battalion 601, which had a notorious 
reputation in the Dirty War for its role in domestic security intelligence.125   
State Department and Department of Defense assistance toward Argentina has 
been positive with what looks like a separation of civilian and military training programs 
geared at internal and external missions respectively.  However the State Department has 
been pushing for a greater role for the military to participate in internally focused 
missions such as counter-narcotics.126 The Argentine military’s viewpoint on internal 
missions seems mixed. Their recent activities in peacekeeping operations in the last 
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decade indicate an external focus.  This was also reinforced in a survey where nearly 76% 
of Argentine military officers who were polled recently stated that internal security 
missions such as counter narcotics should not be a role for the armed forces.127 However, 
in a recent conference on terrorism in the Tri-Border Area sponsored by the Woodrow 
Wilson Center’s Latin American Program, Argentina sent a very different message.  All 
three nations (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) attended, yet Argentina was the only one 
that sent a military officer as its representative and spokesman to give the opening 
remarks.  General Julio Hang, Commanding III Corps of the Argentine Army made his 
feelings clear at the conference when he stated that the police in Argentina were 
incapable of fighting terrorism alone, and that the military would have a role.128Hang’s 
comments seem odd based on the fact that as stated in Chapter III, Argentina maintains a 
National Gendarmerie and Federal Police force with a domestic intelligence branch.  
Both have missions of domestic security and border policing, and the National 
Gendarmerie clearly mentions a counter-terrorism role in its mission statement.129  
Thus the issue is whether Hang truly believes the national security forces within 
his country are not capable of policing terrorism or he is “shopping” for missions for the 
Army in an ever fiscally constrained environment. It is interesting to note that the policy 
analyst interviewed, Argentine Rut Diamint, from the Universidad Torcuato di Tella in 
Buenos Aires had a different view.  She argued that in Argentina, the divisions between 
the roles of the military and police are still not clear enough, and in the fight against 
terrorism these roles must be made very clear, to include transparent funding of their 
separate missions.130  
Michael Desch supports her argument that a lack of resources should not be an 
excuse to blur the roles of the military and security forces in internal missions.  He argues 
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that developing states need to clearly divide the coercive power of the state between their 
military and security forces, and ensure the roles of those forces remain separate, and 
clearly defined.  He goes on to point out that this arrangement can also provide a check 
against the monopoly of coercive power within the state by one organization.131  This 
thesis argues that in the case of Argentina, which has a very capable domestic security 
apparatus, counter-terrorism intelligence operations should be civilian, and military 
intelligence should remain externally focused at the strategic level.  Thus U.S. counter 
terrorism assistance should be directed toward the Ministry of Interior and SIDE.   
This line of argument may seem hypocritical coming from a nation that has 
heavily involved its military in the war on terrorism.  However, the majority of that 
military involvement has been combating terrorism in an expeditionary fashion overseas, 
thus it is not an internal security matter.  Within the United States, the debate is currently 
raging over the roles of Regular vs. National Guard forces involved in internal security.  
This is a healthy sign for a democracy, and one hopes this debate will also continue in 
Argentina.   
Generally, Argentina has been quite receptive to United States foreign policy 
initiatives, and can be regarded as a reliable, cooperative partner in the war on terrorism.  
Argentina’s financial problems may hinder this cooperative effort as it continues to look 
inward toward domestic problems though. In regard to this crisis, the United States needs 
to be careful in its economic policy with Argentina.  Though Argentina bears overall 
responsibility for its current financial crisis, U.S. economic policy toward the country has 
been clearly inconsistent.  This is evidenced in the fact that while the U.S. led 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has withheld loans to Argentina due to poor fiscal 
management, it continues to supply monetary aid to Turkey, which evidence shows has 
an even worse fiscal policy.132  The reason for this is suspected to be Turkey’s value in 
the “war on terror” in Central Asia. This could set a dangerous precedent with one of our 
closest allies in the region.  This problem was further exacerbated by Treasury Secretary 
O’Neil’s statement that checks should be in place to ensure that assistance money does 
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not end up in Swiss bank accounts.133  Shortsighted statements such as this may have 
further strained relations and possibly hurt bilateral cooperation on initiatives, such as 
intelligence sharing.  A recent poll indicated that only 38% of Argentine respondents 
have a positive image of the United States.134 
In sum, Argentina’s domestic security intelligence capability within both the 
SIDE and the Ministry of the Interior is where United States’ cooperation and assistance 
is still needed.  This is for two reasons.  First, Argentina has the internal security 
infrastructure to handle terrorism as a police matter.  The threat has not manifested itself 
within the country that it threatens the national government, and therefore is not a 
military matter.  Second, though, they were able to help the United States avert a tragedy 
in Asuncion; Argentine intelligence suffered two major failures on its own soil with the 
Israeli community center and embassy bombings.  Therefore efforts in improving 
information sharing across agencies, and increasing domestic intelligence capabilities in 
the areas of analysis and dissemination should be major U.S. policy priorities.  In 
addition to improving capabilities, Argentina needs to ensure it is focused on the 
appropriate threat.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Argentina still struggles with 
selecting appropriate targets for surveillance within its domestic intelligence community.   
Thus Argentina is a case where installing appropriate and effective internal oversight 
mechanisms will not only improve civilian control, but should also increase efficiency by 
ensuring targets that are truly in the national interest are being identified by the 
intelligence community.   
 
B. BRAZIL 
Initiatives with Brazil have been less productive than with Argentina.  Prior to 
discussing policy directly related to counter-terrorism or intelligence assistance, it will be 
beneficial to discuss general policy issues to better understand Brazilian attitudes toward 
the United States.   
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The United States and Brazil generally have a good relationship, however 
different perspectives on policy tend to produce clashes from time to time.  Brazil is 
strongly nationalistic and is the dominant military and economic power in Latin America.  
An example of this is that it remains the only country besides the United States in the 
hemisphere that maintains a carrier battle group in its navy, and is looking to significantly 
modernize its air force to be on par with any NATO country.  Brazil is the largest 
economy in Latin America, and tenth largest in the world.  Brazil tends to regard the 
United States as a regional hegemon, which wants to dominate other countries within the 
hemisphere.  This perception has been fortified by the United States’ long history of 
intervention in the domestic politics of many Latin American countries during the 
twentieth century.  Unfortunately, the United States continues to reinforce this perception 
even to day by its actions. 
The best example of myopic foreign policy by the Unites States toward Brazil 
was when it tried to dictate to Brazil how it could spend U.S. dollars received as rent for 
the use of the Brazilian space launch facility at Alcantara.  The United States did not 
want the money it paid to be reinvested into Brazilian space technology, though it 
acknowledges there was really no way to enforce this restriction.135Thus Brazil sees the 
United States trying to dictate how it can spend money that it received for the use of its 
facility on its own soil.  Brazil also does not support the United States’ unilateral 
embargo on Cuba.  Recent efforts by the United States to get an anti-Cuban resolution 
submitted “in absentia” by exerting its influence on other Latin American countries to 
influence their vote at the UN Human Rights Commission (at the time the United States 
was not a voting member on the commission) was flatly rejected and criticized by 
Brazil.136  This type of action by the United States also tends to lend credence to 
suspicions of continued U.S. hegemonic dominance in the hemisphere, and helps explain 
why multilateral cooperative efforts in South America that involve the United States are 
generally viewed with suspicion by Brazil.137 
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The most problematic foreign policy issue between Brazil and the United States is 
the Amazon.  This dilemma is due to the fact that the United States along with much of 
the international community, and environmental organizations feel that Brazil should be 
doing more to preserve the rain forest as a vital part of the world’s ecosystem.  The 
argument has merit since Brazil has allowed a great deal of deforestation to occur, but it 
has become more responsive recently to both environmental concerns, and preserving 
territory for indigenous peoples within the region.  Brazil is very protective over the 
sovereignty of the Amazon region and is highly sensitive to any policy initiatives that 
suggest relinquishing this sovereignty in any way to international control in the interests 
of ecological preservation.  This “ticklishness” over national sovereignty was exhibited 
recently at the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa.  Brazil voted strongly 
to maintain the status quo regarding issues in the region.138   There is even speculation 
that many Brazilians see the United States as wanting to subvert control over the Amazon 
for its own gain.  A recently fabricated map that appeared on the internet renewed these 
suspicions among many Brazilians.  A high school history teacher in Brazil was even 
quoted as saying, “The map may be a falsification, but that the United States covets the 
Amazon and wants to eliminate Brazil’s sovereignty is beyond dispute.”  He was also 
cited as emphasizing this message to students “whenever the opportunity arises.”139 
This extremely high level of concern over Amazonian sovereignty may have an 
adverse affect on information sharing with the United States.  General Alberto Cardoso, 
The Brazilian National Security Advisor’s quote in a recent speech regarding the new 
SIVAM radar surveillance system stated, “Brazil is not selfish” and would share 
intelligence information produced by the system with its neighbors.140 However when 
queried about sharing intelligence from SIVAM with the United States, the project 
director, General Quirico, stated that intelligence sharing only applied to countries that 
share the Amazon region, and that information passed to other countries would “be a 
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matter for the foreign ministry to consider.”141  Though SIVAM was developed with U.S. 
technology, it was strictly a commercial venture, and not part of an assistance package, 
thus there it has no influence in sharing Brazilian intelligence.  Brazil does not need 
“hand-outs” from the United States.  Trust must be deepened through policy initiatives 
that demonstrate to Brazil that the United States is not simply looking to advance its own 
agendas within the hemisphere.     
Apart from the issues of SIVAM, recent bi-lateral cooperation between the 
countries has intensified, through efforts by the State Department.  This is evidenced in 
Brazil receiving training through the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
Program.  Part of Brazil’s reciprocation has been increased information sharing.142  
Recent evidence of this cooperation was when General Alberto Cardoso, the National 
Security Advisor, visited the United States in November 2001 to discuss what measures 
Brazil had taken to investigate potential terrorist threats in the Tri-Border Area.143This is 
encouraging, but as will be argued below, Brazil tends to play down the threat in the Tri-
Border Area, due to economic and political concerns.  The United States also plans to 
increase counter-narcotics aid to Brazil from an average of $3.6 million to over $16 
million in 2002; an increase of about 345% in funding.  Though this is a significant 
increase, the aid package as a whole is quite small, and will have little effect on U.S. 
policy influence with Brazil.  The focus of this funding is on Brazil’s “Operation Cobra” 
program to better secure its Amazonian border region with Colombia, which has become 
a major problem due to its remote location and increased cross-border incursions by the 
FARC.144 
A major effort by the State Department and Department of Defense was rewarded 
when Congress authorized the Pentagon to sell F16 fighters to Brazil with AMRAAM 
beyond-visual-range missile technology.145 Though motivated primarily to award General 
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Dynamics with a major contract, this deal has an added benefit.  It may help mitigate the 
perception of the United States as trying to be the dominant player in the Western 
Hemisphere.  By selling Brazil an advanced aircraft with state of the art technology, the 
United States is sending Brazil a message that it sees the country more as a regional 
partner, more of an equal within the hemisphere than a subordinate.  Whether this gesture 
was intentional or not, it should help reverse a very contradictory policy toward Latin 
America regarding advanced weapon sales, especially with aircraft that the United States 
has maintained for nearly thirty years.146 Additionally, this capability would allow the 
Brazilians to participate in major exercises with U.S. units.  Confidence between the 
countries could be built through this avenue, and may provide inroads with Brazil on 
other policy initiatives, such as counter-terrorism. 
Brazil’s receptiveness to United States’ foreign policy initiatives is varied.  As 
evidenced above, it receives limited economic aid and training from the United States, 
and is very careful not to align itself too closely with U.S. policy.  Simply defining the 
terrorist threat in the Tri-Border Area has been a contentious issue between the United 
States and Brazil.  This is due to the fact that Brazil has a major vested tourism interest 
within the Tri-Border Area, and to admit to terrorist activity would hurt business.  In a 
summit between the nations that share the Tri-Border Area and the United States, 
Ambassador to the United States Rubens Barbosa of Brazil reiterated the fact that his 
country cooperated fully with U.S. requests after September 11th, but also stated that no 
actual evidence exists of terrorist activity within the area.  This was in direct conflict to 
the statements made by the Paraguayan representative, Marcial Bobadilla, Deputy Chief 
of Mission for the Paraguayan Embassy in Washington D.C.147  
Secondly, Brazil has a significant Arab population that is well integrated into 
Brazilian society.  Recent counter-terrorism initiatives in the Brazilian city of Foz do 
Iguacu have caused rancor within this population, something which the Brazilian 
government is very sensitive to.148This sensitivity also stems from accusations by the 
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Muslim community that the Brazilian intelligence services were unfairly targeting them 
well before September 11th.149Finally is the issue of what threat Brazil is focused on.  
From a Brazilian perspective, securing its Amazonian border with Colombia takes far 
higher precedence than emerging threats in the Tri-Border Area.  “Operation Cobra” was 
designed by the military and civil government to address what they see as Brazil’s 
primary security threat. Forming a Southern Cone security system with efforts focused on 
its borders with Argentina and Paraguay is seen as having only marginal returns. 150 
 Brazil has shown a willingness to cooperate with countries to combat terrorism 
though. This is evidenced by its security agreement within MERCOSUR with Argentina 
and Paraguay to better secure the Tri-Border Area, talks with Argentina to integrate their 
intelligence capabilities to better combat terrorism,151and even an international counter- 
terrorism treaty signed with Russia.152 Brazil has also shown a willingness to hold 
suspected terrorists for extradition.  Once again, the colorful Mr. Barakat enters into this 
equation. The Brazilian Supreme Court ordered his arrest in support of a Paraguayan 
request for his extradition, after he fled Ciudad del Este when Paraguayan security forces 
began sweeping the area for suspected terrorists after September 11th.153 A second 
example is Brazil’s holding of Ibrahim Soliman for extradition, wanted by the Egyptian 
government for connection with bombings in Egypt.154     
Thus, United States policy toward Brazil should be to foster greater economic and 
security cooperation between the countries, and deepen Brazilian trust in U.S. 
information sharing initiatives.  Policy must be perceived as working to build an equal 
partnership that benefits both countries and is not seen as an attempt to promote U.S. 
dominance.  After September 11th, Brazil was very proactive in response to the United 
States’ requests to track potential threats within the region.  The United States must be 
careful to ensure its policy towards Brazil is not shortsighted in nature, such as with the 
                                                 
149 EFE News Service, (U.S) [Lexis Nexis database] December 16, 2000 
150 Pion-Berlin, pp. 52-53 
151 EFE News Service (Brasilia) [Lexis Nexis] October 8, 2001 
152 Moscow Kommersant (Moscow) January 15, 2002 
153 Associated Press (Rio De Janeiro) [Lexis Nexis] June 22, 2002 
154 EFE News Service (Curitiba, Brazil) [Lexis Nexis] April, 16th, 2002 
   69
Alcantara agreement.  Brazil has the tenth largest economy in the world. It needs to be 
recognized as a major world power and dealt with as such.  Brazil is aware of the threat 
terrorism poses to its security, as evidenced by its recent counter-terrorism activity and 
initiatives.  However, it will be a reluctant player in a U.S.-led counter-terrorism 
coalition.  Some analysts feel that if Brazil is to cooperate in a multilateral coalition to 
include sharing intelligence in the Southern Cone, it needs to be the coalition leader.155 
Pion-Berlin also supports this argument when he notes that Brazil’s participation in 
MERCOSUR is due to it being the “regional giant” and the fact that the system is not like 
the European Union, with supranational controls that might restrict its actions.156 
    
C. PARAGUAY 
Since September 11th, Paraguay has been very cooperative with the United States 
in the areas of investigating terrorist organizations within Ciudad de Este.  However the 
effectiveness of this cooperation remains in question.  Paraguay’s initial response was to 
send out sweeps that rounded up various individuals suspected of fundraising for terrorist 
organizations in the Middle East. While significant players like Barakat were put out of 
business, many innocent businessmen may have been caught up in the sweeps.  This has 
created a lot of tension and anger by citizens in Ciudad del Este toward the United States.   
Paraguay is also a willing participant in Department of Defense sponsored 
multilateral training exercises in the region.157  Military equipment sales to Paraguay are 
miniscule in comparison to Argentina and Brazil.  This primarily due to the very small 
size of the country’s armed forces and limited budget for defense.  
The United States certified Paraguay in 2000 in its counter-narcotics effort, saving 
it from its second decertification, even though it missed most of its required targets.158 
This brings into question Paraguay’s ability to police transnational threats such as narco-
trafficking and terrorism.  Even regional players question this ability.  In a recent 
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interview with Brazilian Federal Police from Foz do Iguacu, one was quite skeptical of 
the efforts made by local Paraguayan police to manage threats within Ciudad del Este.159  
Current State Department and Department of Defense initiatives with Paraguay have 
been military assistance to Paraguayan army and national police to better equip these 
forces to fight terrorists and narco-traffickers.  Lack of controls on the waterways and 
airstrips in the region has been a major U.S. concern, and aid has been focused on 
improving Paraguay’s ability to police these areas.  Due to Special Forces involvement 
and the paramilitary nature of such aid and training, some analysts have felt this type of 
training too closely resembles counterinsurgency activity.160 With Paraguay’s unstable 
political situation, these concerns could be quite legitimate.  Without a solid democratic 
regime in place, assistance to Paraguay and better equipping their forces to combat a 
certain threat could easily be used or abused in other ways by a corrupt regime.   
Some analysts consider corruption within Paraguay systemic. 161 This problem 
undermines the country’s counter terrorism efforts. Evidence shows corruption within the 
Social Security Administration, National Electricity Authority, Highway Department and 
other public sectors. The word “kleptocracy” has even been used in one case to describe 
the fact that all branches of the government are affected by it. 162 Though the president 
signed an anti-corruption agreement with the World Bank to make it a better prospect for 
loans, there is little evidence of improvement within the country.163The most damming 
evidence has been Transparency International’s 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index, 
which listed Paraguay as one of the most corrupt nations in the world, scoring a dismal 
1.7 out of a possible 10.  This placed Paraguay 100 out of 102 countries scored.164  
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Paraguay has attempted to make progress by addressing the issue of money 
laundering, and created a money laundering division within the country’s central bank.  
This will help track illicit cash flows that might be funding terrorism, but the problem is 
that a lot of the money going to terrorist organizations has been through legitimate 
donations from individuals to organizations such as Hezbollah, or sent as remittances to 
families in the Middle East. 
Beyond corruption is the issue of Paraguay’s massive underground economy.  
Some economists estimate that half of Paraguay’s economy is dependent on 
smuggling.165  This economy has been stagnant, and even shrinking since 1995.  Thus, 
without any legitimate economic improvement, going after illegitimate financing will 
probably produce even greater adverse affects on a situation that is already very poor.  
This would be quite unpopular with the many people dependent on these revenues. This 
is a situation that the Paraguayan government may not be able to pursue until some type 
of assistance is provided to produce more viable legitimate economic alternatives for 
people.  A recent poll conducted in Paraguay noted that people’s dissatisfaction with the 
current government’s economic policies is so high that 80% of those polled thought life 
was better under Stroessner’s dictatorship.166 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Paraguay announced that it disbanded its 
state intelligence agency due to abuses and public outcry against it.  Thus Paraguay is 
hardly in a capable position to be a major partner in a multilateral intelligence 
information sharing coalition with Argentina and Brazil.  At the national level, Paraguay 
seems to be a willing participant, however evidence shows that due to ineptness and 
corruption within the public sector, little can be done to effectively stem terrorism.  The 
other major issue with Paraguay is the fact that intelligence services of other countries 
would be naturally apprehensive to share information that might have to reveal sources, 
thus potentially compromising them within a corrupt system.  Finally, though Paraguay 
has been very supportive of U.S. policy at the federal level, the community of Ciudad de 
Este, which is the heart of the Tri-Border Area, has denied the terrorist threat exists.  It 
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has even gone so far as to threaten to sue the United States for slander over the 
issue.167Thus it is suspect how solid cooperation at the local level really is.   
This is the heart of the dilemma for sharing intelligence in the Tri Border Area: 
the country with the greatest emerging terrorist threat is the least capable of containing it 
or collecting and sharing crucial information to defeat it.  Thus, Paraguay’s problem is 
everyone’s problem within the region, to include the United States, since it is one of the 
primary targets of terrorist attacks that result from the funds being generated within the 
region.   
The key underlying problem is that Paraguay’s civic infrastructure must be built 
up and developed to a level that instills confidence and that democratic norms are 
actually respected.  This requires aid to civic institutions, especially in the area of judicial 
reform at all levels.  The current policy of attempting to make the Paraguayan 
paramilitary police and armed forces better capable of combating the threat is like putting 
the cart before the horse.  These forces will be hamstrung by a corrupt system no matter 
how professional they become.  If captured terrorists can simply buy their way out of the 
system, or the intelligence agencies are infiltrated due to the fact that agents are easily 
bribed, the whole purpose of the police and military aid is defeated.  The State 
Department provided $12 million in USAID money in 2001 in an effort to strengthen 
democracy through civic institutions. 168  This is certainly a start in the right direction, but 
more civic assistance is needed.  Part of this answer may lie in Paraguay’s Partnership 
with the Massachusetts Army National Guard. 
Paraguay is the only National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) participant 
within the group. If ever a country were designed for the goals of the SPP program, it is 
Paraguay.  The purpose of the SPP program is to improve bilateral relations with the 
United States and the partnership country and promote regional stability and civil-
military relationships in support of U.S. policy objectives.169 The program begins with 
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military to military contacts, but the goal is to move toward civic assistance by fostering 
civilian government contacts between the National Guard state and host country 
governments.  A good example is the Montana National Guard and Kyrgyzstan 
partnership.  Initial contacts started with combat lifesaver training between the National 
Guard and the Kyrgyzstani military.  It has evolved into formal direct contacts between 
civic governments within Montana and civic governments in Kyrgyzstan, thus 
strengthening democracy through improving the country’s civil government capability.170 
Massachusetts’ partnership with Paraguay is still in the initial stages.  Discussion 
with the SPP Program Coordinator revealed they are doing a military to military 
engagement with an engineer exercise, but no civic assistance programs have been 
considered yet.171As this partnership evolves, Massachusetts has the potential to play a 
significant role in improving Paraguay’s civic stability.  Emphasizing this program would 
complement the State Department USAID assistance strategy to build up Paraguay’s civil 
government capabilities.  The State Partnership programs that have been emphasized 
have a track record of success.  Such examples are Montana/ Kyrgyzstan, North 
Carolina/Moldova, and California/Ukraine.  All of these programs have evolved beyond 
military exchanges, and there are contacts between the governments of the States and 
host countries.   
The emphasis of the Massachusetts and Paraguay partnership would be best 
served in improving Paraguay’s civil government.  One is tempted to think about this 
program coming in with a fix-it plan for the country’s intelligence community, to make it 
a more capable player in the region.  An example might be to develop a coordination 
center modeled after Massachusetts’ state emergency operations center, maybe even 
some assistance from their own state bureau of investigation, but with Paraguay, the 
people have a lack of trust in the government, especially in its security and intelligence 
community.  Trust must be reestablished by first building a foundation for a solid 
government that can escape its rampant levels of corruption and abuse.  This is where an 
SPP civil assistance initiative will be best served.    
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In sum, Paraguay is a very willing coalition partner with the United States’ and its 
policy to fight terrorism.  However, until its civil government becomes more effective 
and democracy becomes truly consolidated, it will be ineffective.  Two concrete 
indicators of democratic stability in Paraguay will be (1) when the president’s term ends, 
the threat of a coup is not clearly present as it has been in the past decade, and (2) while 
the president is in office, he or she is not under consideration for impeachment for 
corruption scandals.  Those who feel the military will remain in the barracks in Latin 
America during unrest only need to turn to Paraguay to find the situation is not that clear.  
As recently as May 2002, the Army attempted a coup.172 Though it was an almost farcical 
show of force by a mere company of tanks, it is still an indicator that solid democratic 
control has not been achieved by any means.  
 
D. UNITED STATES INITIATIVES 
One area that the State Department could immediately improve on is to quit 
rewarding failure.  If Paraguay cannot perform the tasks for which it is receiving 
certification, such as its counter-narcotics operations, it should not continue to be 
certified and receive funding.  By continuing to certify Paraguay in its substandard 
counter-narcotics performance, there is little incentive for the country to improve its 
operations.  What is the purpose of having a certification program, if a failure to certify 
does not have any consequences?  Paraguay is heavily reliant on the United States,173 
thus Washington can exert a great deal of influence over this country.  U.S. policy should 
be carefully crafted to ensure that by pulling aid for lack of performance, it entices 
improvement, yet does not do more harm than good by helping cause the economy to 
falter, as occurred in Colombia in the early 1990’s.  Secondly this should not be a 
unilateral action.  Argentina and Brazil need to take a similar stance with their training 
assistance programs.  If the United States acts unilaterally in this regard, it will be seen as 
a hegemonic act, exercising its significant dominance over this tiny country.  This could 
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do a great deal of damage in fostering cooperation with regional powers such as Brazil.  
Therefore it is in the best interests of the United States to convince Argentina and Brazil 
that funding assistance programs in Paraguay should be conditional on performance.  It is 
in everyone’s best interests within the region for Paraguay to reach a level of capability to 
deal with its security threats.  Argentina should be an easy sell, since the two bombings it 
experienced in the 1990’s originated from Paraguay.  
U.S. counter terrorism aid and policy toward each country has been reviewed 
separately.  As in the previous chapter, one sees vast differences in attitudes and 
capabilities of the recipient countries.  This raises the question of what should overall 
U.S. strategy be for the region, whether a multilateral approach to sharing intelligence is 
really feasible? 
With respect to strategy, the United States needs to ensure that each country 
within the Tri-Border Area is capable of addressing the primary emerging terrorist threat.  
This has been funding terrorist activity abroad, primarily to the Middle East as detailed in 
Chapter II.  Therefore each country needs to have the capability to track the money flow 
internally and have a mechanism or agency that can collate that intelligence and build a 
comprehensive picture.  The International Monetary Fund’s study on the financing of 
terrorism in regard to sharing economic information states,  
 
The failure to share information creates negative cross-border 
externalities that compromise the fight against predicate crime and 
terrorism” and that “This complexity implies that no single agency can be 
expected to resolve the problem independently; multiple actors at the 
national and international levels must contribute. 174 
 
Of the three, Paraguay has been the most proactive, with its central bank task 
force, and the fact it has made arrests of individuals suspected of funding terrorist 
activity.  The fact that Argentina and Brazil do not have the capability to track these 
money flows abroad has led to a debate between the three countries as to what actually is 
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the terrorist threat in the region. 175 The first step is to help each country get better 
financial tracking systems in place, through their banking systems.  The IMF working 
with Mercosur would be an ideal start.  Mercosur would also be the best agency to foster 
regional coordination as an economic intelligence analytic center to allow this 
information to be gathered, processed, and shared with the United States.    
First and foremost though is to get each of these countries fully committed to 
stemming the flow of money to terrorist organizations.  All three countries need to ratify 
the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism.176 This will eliminate ambiguity as to what constitutes the financing of 
terrorism and clearly establishes the legal mandate to prosecute those who participate in 
this activity, whether through illicit funds or legitimate remittances.177  Paraguay should 
be willing to do this, based on its willingness to establish a money laundering section 
within its central bank as noted above.  Argentina, the recipient of two bombings in the 
past should also be easy to convince.  Brazil, once again, will be the challenge.  This 
means it would have to enter into a supranational agreement, primarily sponsored by the 
United States. It has not been the recipient of any significant terrorist acts.  It also must 
consider the sensitivities of its Muslim population in the Foz do Iguacu area, further 
exacerbated by recent actions after September 11th.  These are all compelling reasons for 
Brazil to want to maintain the status quo. 
The second part of the question is how effective can one expect multilateral 
cooperation against terrorism in the Tri-Border area to be.  Paul Wilkinson makes a very 
compelling argument that bilateral cooperation has been the most effective technique in 
combating terrorism in Europe, especially in the areas of border policing and sharing 
intelligence information.178   His major criticism of multilateral initiatives has been that 
one generally ends up with a “watered down” product due to the fact it is so difficult to 
get a consensus from all parties involved.  The fact that there have been clear examples of 
                                                 
175 O Globo (Rio de Janeiro) February 3, 2002 
176 Available [Online] http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm accessed June 10, 2002 
177 See Article 2 of the convention  
178 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London: Cass, 2002) p. 
121 
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bilateral cooperation between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay cooperating with their 
border patrols, at the local and state police levels tends to justify Wilkinson’s conclusion 
that this level is where cooperation is most effective, and the higher the level of 
cooperation goes, the less effective it tends to become.179  
In the area of policing borders and containing terrorist transnational movements 
within the region Wilkinson’s logic seems quite sound.  This is due to the fact that the 
Tri-Border Area is policed by several different agencies, all at different capabilities, so 
Wilkinson would argue that in a multilateral agreement, the lowest common denominator 
would emerge.  In this region, that would not be a very effective solution.  The problem is 
Wilkinson also bases this argument on European examples, especially in regard to the 
Basque separatist ETA, which do not have a lot of latitude, since they are tied to their 
region.  This is not the case in the Tri-Border Area, since the threat is not concerned 
about issues of national sovereignty within the region.  It is likely that in a bilateral 
situation, the threat would migrate to an area where the controls are not as efficient.  This 
is especially the case with the primary threat in the region: financing terrorism.  As the 
IMF study cited above argues, all countries involved must play a role and coordinate their 
effort, or else the funding activity will simply move to the region where financial tracking 
is least capable, and continue, relatively unabated.  Once again this supports Frank 
Mora’s argument previously stated in Chapter II regarding the balloon effect, when he 
describes how a lack of multilateral effort in combating narcotics trafficking simply 
drove the traffickers to other regions, with no noticeable loss in production.   
In conclusion, United States’ foreign policy toward the Tri-Border Area needs to 
focus on an endstate that will allow agencies to build an effective multilateral 
intelligence- sharing network.  But in the near term, policy must be bilaterally focused to 
address each country’s different capabilities and shortcomings in counter terrorism 
intelligence.  The United States must realize that in it will have to deal with each country 
in the region in a different way, to bring about the same result: international cooperation 
on terrorism.  There is not one easy prescribed “fix-it kit” or comprehensive Anti-
Terrorism Assistance package that the State Department can pull off the shelf that will 
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solve the problem.  Willingness and competence must be built within each country at the 
national level to foster the international cooperation needed to combat the terrorist threat 
at the regional level. 
The next chapter will expand on these issues, and look at what tools are available 
to the United States to foster bilateral and eventual regional cooperation in intelligence 
sharing.  The role of Mercosur in this endeavor will be examined in detail.  Some 
prescriptions for the State Partnership Program and Paraguay will be offered in regard to 
civic assistance and improving the Paraguayan government’s ability to improve its 
legitimacy and efficiency.  Also an intelligence model for Paraguay will be offered 
tailored to transnational threats, and with control and oversight mechanisms that can 
bring the community from a political police back to the realm of a domestic intelligence 
bureau that respects democracy.  For a multilateral effort to work, Paraguay must have 
the ability to fight the intelligence war.  Yet that ability cannot hijack its fragile 
democracy, thus this particular dilemma will be examined and a solution proposed. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer policy recommendations for each country 
to better align their intelligence communities toward the ideal type model.  It will first 
review what deficiencies exist within each country’s intelligence community, and how 
those deficiencies can be addressed to improve their oversight and efficiency.  This will 
allow each country to be more effective in gathering, analyzing, and sharing intelligence 
within the Tri Border Area.  The chapter will then review United States foreign policy 
toward each country to determine what improvements in policy may allow a deepening of 
trust, thus facilitating greater cooperation on a bilateral level.  Finally, the chapter will 
argue that Mercosur is the best vehicle to manage coordination of collection efforts, and 
information sharing on the Tri Border Area at a regional, multilateral level. 
 
A. ARGENTINA 
Structurally, the Argentine intelligence community is the best of the three 
countries examined.  As noted in Chapter III, it offers multiple, competitive all-source 
agencies, has clearly divided roles and missions, oversight is present, and intelligence 
continues to be an issue of national importance within the government and especially the 
legislature. 
Argentina needs to focus on improving internal oversight mechanisms within each 
agency.  The best method for this would be to develop Inspector General (IG) office with 
its head appointed by the minister that oversees each agency.  Thus the minister of the 
interior would appoint IG’s for the National Gendarmerie, Coast Guard, and Federal 
Police.  The dilemma of IG’s is that externally appointed ones are usually pariah’s within 
the department they oversee, and internally appointed ones become co-opted and “rubber 
stamp” the policies of the agency director.  Argentina will need to look for examples of 
successful IG programs within the military or other civilian agencies that they could 
emulate.  John Gentry, a former intelligence professional with the CIA argues that two 
methods to improve inspectors general is to give them the ability to report directly to the 
executive or congressional oversight committees, and develop a separate career field for 
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personnel working in the IG office, thus eliminating concerns over co-optation or 
retribution when not assigned in an IG status.180   
An example of a good IG program that has independent oversight, and seems to 
develop a good working relationship with the bureau it oversees is the U.S. Army 
Inspector General Directorate and its relationship to each state’s Army National Guard.  
Within each state, a Regular Army officer, outside of the National Guard chain of 
command oversees each Inspector General Office for that state.  This author’s experience 
with the IG program within the Nevada Army National Guard has been very positive.  
The office has a very good reputation within the state for its professionalism and 
objectivity.  Besides investigating complaints, the office is also a resource for 
commanders to consult prior to taking action, to ensure they remain within Army legal 
guidelines.  In addition to this example, Peter Gill remarks favorably on the Australian 
Intelligence community’s IG program; with the exception of it being greatly 
undermanned.181 
The second area that Argentina needs to improve is its ability to share information 
within its own agencies.  Before Argentina can be an effective regional participant, it 
must be able to communicate and analyze consolidated intelligence internally.  This is 
where United States assistance is probably most needed.  Due to Argentina’s current 
financial crisis, the country is in no position to invest the money required for expensive 
state-of –the-art computer databases.  This is a very relevant issue for the United States as 
well, since it also sees improving information sharing and dissemination within its own 
intelligence community as a major priority in the aftermath of September 11th.  Therefore, 
it would be in the United States’ best interests to help Argentina develop a system that 
can better share information within its national intelligence community, and also among 
regional partners down to the bilateral level between local police forces.  Though this is a 
bilateral initiative, it should be addressed within a regional forum, such as the CICTE or 
Mercosur.  Thus it will ensure compatibility with other systems in the region, such as 
those in Brazil, especially at the state police level.  It may also offer a blueprint for 
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systems in need within other areas in Latin American as well, thus the proverbial wheel 
does not have to be reinvented.  
The fallout between the SIDE and the CIA was a major even at the time, but it 
may have been overcome for the most part.  This is evident in ongoing cooperation that 
still occurs.  A genuine effort by the United States to help improve the Argentine 
intelligence network could do a lot to deepen trust and cooperation between both 
countries. Finally, Argentina’s domestic crisis needs to be addressed more proactively by 
the United States.  The sooner Argentina becomes more stable, the sooner, her domestic 
security intelligence will refocus on transnational threats, instead of issues of domestic 
unrest.  What must be clearly understood is Argentina remains the strongest ally of the 
United States in combating terrorism in the Southern Cone.  The analyst and writer, 
Mariano Bartolome, supports this argument when he states,  
 
Argentina is the only country in the Southern Cone where the 
government understands transnational terrorism as a serious and “real” 
threat.  Brazil is simply looking to the other side and Paraguay…well, 
Paraguay is a kind of virtual state where you can find a high degree of 
corruption at every level of government.182   
     
 In sum, the United States needs to craft its policy toward Argentina so that she 
remains a strong ally within the region.  This can be achieved through practical aid and 
assistance, and through policies and actions that show support for the country in time of 
crisis. 
B. BRAZIL 
 Brazil, like Argentina, has a very capable intelligence system.  The key issue is 
making the Tri-Border area a priority within the Brazilian intelligence community.  The 
best way to do this is to increase trust and deepen relations between Brazil and the United 
States to improve bilateral cooperation.  Where the United States can help Brazil 
specifically to improve its intelligence community is to help it develop better 
congressional oversight.  As argued earlier in Chapter II, oversight and accountability can 
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directly affect efficiency.  Brazil has the assets and technological capability.  What the 
country needs most is direction within its community from civilian authorities. 
 The Center for Civil Military Relations’ efforts assist the Brazilian government in 
developing specific intelligence oversight committees within congress is a major step 
forward for intelligence oversight in Brazil.  By moving intelligence oversight out of the 
defense committees, and giving it the attention it deserves, intelligence should become an 
issue of greater importance within the legislature.  This will hopefully get intelligence 
more into the arena of public debate and scrutiny, forcing policy makers to address these 
very issues of information sharing, collection priorities, targeting, and what constitutes a 
threat to the nation.  Through this debate, the Brazilian intelligence system will continue 
to evolve and improve.  This evolution occurred in Argentina.  Its intelligence 
community’s greatest progress toward the ideal type model has been since 
democratization in 1983, due in a large part to the priority that intelligence issues have 
had in congress and public concern over intelligence due to the Dirty War. 
 Brazil has made meaningful progress in improving its intelligence capabilities to 
combat transnational threats.  As noted in Chapter III, the country is investing money to 
improve regional police intelligence capabilities, and continues to improve its ability to 
track money laundering and financing of terrorism abroad.  These efforts need to be 
supported by the United States, and as with Argentina, any technical assistance to 
improve the Brazilian Intelligence community’s ability to gather and share information 
should be a top priority. 
 Brazil must be dealt with as a regional partner, in equal standing with the United 
States in the hemisphere.  Policy should be crafted that shows trust and respect for the 
nation.  The F16 sales negotiation is a good example.  It would have been a serious 
mistake had policymakers heeded outspoken opponents of the deal in Congress, and not 
allowed Brazil the opportunity to purchase the aircraft in its fully capable state.  To 
believe this would prevent over-the-horizon missile technology from entering Latin 
America is a fantasy, as the Peruvians have already shown.183 This is not a technology 
                                                 
183 Peru purchased MiG-29 fighters from Belarus with over-the-horizon missile technology.  Brazil is 
still negotiating with France in a deal with advanced Mirage fighters with the technology. 
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that the United States has a monopoly on, thus not supplying it will not prevent its 
emergence into the Southern Hemisphere.  More importantly, it would have been seen as 
the United States once again treating Brazil as a subordinate player in the hemisphere, not 
capable of handling itself internationally.  Finally, by allowing Brazil to have up-to-date 
technology, it facilitates giving its military the capability to conduct real-world, 
externally focused military missions with coalition forces abroad.  This could lead its 
military intelligence apparatus to focus on more appropriate targets, besides the landless 
peasant movement, and other internal security issues that should be in the purview of the 
civilian authorities. 
 In sum, getting Brazil to reciprocate to United States’ initiatives to share 
intelligence in the Tri-Border Area will hinge on overall U.S. policy toward the country, 
thus it is critical that this policy remain far-sighted.  Brazil is the regional hegemon in the 
Southern Cone, and its participation or lack thereof, will shape the success or failure of a 
regional intelligence-sharing network.  This policy toward Brazil will certainly be tested 
in the upcoming months as President Lula de Silva takes the helm in Brazil.  His leftist, 
militant stance and populist rhetoric during his recent presidential campaign has not been 
received well in Washington.  Lula has used populism; specifically preaching a backlash 
to U.S. sponsored economic reforms to fuel his popularity with the masses.184 Thus 
engagement with Brazil, and emphasizing that tracking transnational threats in the Tri-
Border area are not just in the interests of the United States, but the entire region will 
remain a challenging task.  
 
C. PARAGUAY 
 As Mariano Bartolome argued above, Paraguay must be addressed as an entire 
system, not just by its intelligence community.  To offer policy recommendations 
specifically geared to improve Paraguay’s domestic intelligence capability without 
addressing the issues of rampant and systemic corruption would be irresponsible.  The 
result would be a regime police that would be co-opted by the elites in power and used 
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for their benefit. As argued in Chapter III, the old Paraguayan intelligence service was 
used in this capacity, even after democratization.  
Therefore the issue of corruption must be addressed as well, and that is fertile 
ground for an entirely separate thesis.  One recommendation that will be offered is, that 
like the example of its counter-narcotics certification, one must not reward failure.  With 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, progress in fighting corruption 
can be gauged.  Therefore progress within this index, and favorable reports from 
organizations like the Financial Action Task Force (or its regional equivalent, GAFISUD) 
could be used by organizations like the IMF and World Bank to base loan arrangements.  
The same approach could be used for U.S. aid in areas of military equipment and 
training.  As progress in made, cooperation and aid intensifies, if progress does not occur, 
one must question whether it is wise to give equipment and training to a regime that can 
be easily co-opted by the very forces that the equipment and training are being used to 
defeat. 
Thus, as stated in Chapter IV, programs such as the National Guard State 
Partnership program should be geared to overall development, and not a specific issue, 
such as intelligence networks.  Paraguay’s plight also makes the State Partnership 
Program that much more critical to its success.  If through the program, initiatives can be 
developed that build government efficiency, its legitimacy with the people will increase 
and this in turn may allow democratic stability to return to the country.185  Secondly, if 
the program can develop initiatives that reinforce stability, this would increase legitimate 
investment, which the country desperately needs to boost its economy.  Therefore a 
second area in which research can be furthered is what specific initiatives the State 
Partnership Program with Paraguay may want to involve itself in with the specific intent 
of increasing the legitimacy of its government and economic development. 
But, as stated in Chapter III, it is unrealistic to imagine that Paraguay will disband 
its state intelligence service and not have an organ to replace it.  An even more dangerous 
development is the government officially disbands its intelligence service, as it stated it 
                                                 
185 Author is referring to the classic argument first articulated by Juan Linz in The Breakdown of 
Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1978) 
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had in the media (see Chapter III), and “unofficial” intelligence heads begin to grow from 
the police and military, which have no oversight mechanisms in place.   
Therefore, in closing, a model is offered for a Paraguayan civilian intelligence 
agency modeled after the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR).  The reason for this is State’s Bureau of INR is very small.  It would not require a 
large operational budget, something that Paraguay does not have.  It does not have an 
operational element, something that could easily be abused through covert operations; 
and yet INR is a very highly respected part of the U.S. intelligence community due to its 
professionalism and ability to get good, concise, and relevant intelligence quickly into the 
hands of policymakers.186   A central intelligence agency like INR would allow Paraguay 
to still gather information on transnational threats within the Tri-Border Area, share this 
information effectively with other regional partners, and it would pose the least amount 
of a threat to Paraguay’s fragile democracy as opposed to a more robust organization 
such as a U.S.-styled CIA or a SIDE would.   
The proposed community (figure 5) would have a central intelligence agency 
modeled after State INR.  Its primary role would be to conduct economic and domestic 
security intelligence based on transnational threats.  It would not have an operational 
directorate, thus it would provide intelligence for the national police, and also military if 
they were being used for issues of border security or counter-terrorism.  This intelligence 
dissemination and direction would be managed by an intelligence coordination center, 
similar to Argentina’s National Intelligence Center (figure 2).  Military Intelligence 
would be focused on strategic threat analysis, and possibly overseas transnational threats 
that might affect Paraguay.  It would have no domestic role whatsoever.  Oversight would 
be established through inspector generals at the agency level that would report to the 
intelligence coordination center.  Executive oversight would be this center, which would 
be the executive’s tool to ensure intelligence is focused on genuine issues of the state’s 
interest.  Congressional oversight would be achieved through specific intelligence 
oversight committees established in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.  Public 
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oversight would rest with the media, which as argued in Chapter III, seems to be quite 
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D. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 
 The previous section examined each country as an individual to determine how 
U.S. policy and assistance could improve each separate community in a bilateral fashion.  
But, this thesis argued in Chapter IV that multilateral cooperation was crucial to tracking 
the primary threat in the Tri-Border Area: financing of terrorism.  Therefore, it is argued 
that the United States needs to look at cooperating with existing networks within the area 
to share information multilaterally.  Also, it is argued that Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay, as well as Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia are well on their way to developing 
effective multilateral cooperation through Mercosur.  Mercosur needs to be the lead 
agency that fosters multilateral cooperation on intelligence information sharing regarding 
transnational threats in the Tri-Border Area.  This is due to the fact that it developed as an 
economic organization, therefore is likely to be best equipped to process and analyze 
economic intelligence.  Second, it is an organization highly regarded by all participating 
and associate members, therefore high levels of cooperation already exist through the 
organization.  Finally, Mercosur has taken the lead in the aftermath of September 11th in 
forming security working groups for the purpose of increasing multilateral cooperation as 
discussed in Chapter III.  Therefore as a regional organization, Mercosur offers the best 
chance of intelligence cooperation within the Tri-Border Area. 
 One recommendation is for the United States intelligence community to seek the 
establishment of a liaison office within Mercosur for the purpose of sharing information.  
It is further recommended that State INR take the lead on this initiative.  This is for two 
reasons.  First, the primary purpose of a liaison office within Mercosur would be to have 
access to data that is being gathered by the national agencies within the region, after it 
has been compiled and analyzed by the Mercosur permanent security working group 
(GTP), thus the need for operative agents in the field would not be required. As argued 
earlier, INR may offer insight and expertise that the GTP could benefit from due to INR’s 
reputation for highly regarded analysis within the U.S. intelligence community.  Second, 
State INR may be a lot more palatable to work with vs. CIA or NSA with countries such 
as Brazil, and to a lesser extent Argentina, after its recent friction with the CIA.   
 Part of a U.S. liaison office within Mercosur could also include technical 
assistance not only in analysis as mentioned above, but in improving Mercosur’s 
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technological capabilities to track money flows from the region, a very difficult task that 
requires sophisticated technology, significant resources, and a global reach; all things that 
the United States possesses as demonstrated when it launched an intensive effort to track 
Osama bin Laden’s global financial network after September 11th. 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
 The Tri Border Area of South America shared by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
presents unique challenges for these nations to govern due to the fact that all aspects of 
the area such as border control, immigration, trade, and combating transnational crimes 
must be cooperative efforts between the countries.  This is precisely why transnational 
threats will emerge in areas such as this.  It is important to craft solid organizations that 
can effectively deal with these threats as they emerge, and not get caught in the trap of 
reacting to their actions, thus being set up for failure.  As argued in Chapter II, an 
effective intelligence organization must get into the terrorist decision cycle to defeat it.  
Denying the problem exists will simply make it an even greater problem to solve down 
the road.  Therefore a country debating whether or not a threat exists is moot.  The 
evidence shows that transnational illegal activity exists.  If it is not dealt with now it will 
certainly grow. 
 The United States can greatly effect this intelligence war against transnational 
threats in the Tri-Border Area; both positively and negatively.  It must craft its foreign 
policy carefully, with long-term goals in mind.  It may even have to defer its own near 
term interests to ensure greater cooperation from the countries involved.  As financial 
crisis emerge in South America, and populist presidents continue to get elected, this will 
require a high level of statecraft to ensure trust is both maintained and deepened. 
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